



---

The Derveni Papyrus ("Diagoras of Melos, Apopyrgizontes Logoi?"): A New Translation

Author(s): Richard Janko

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Classical Philology*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 1-32

Published by: [The University of Chicago Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1215469>

Accessed: 15/05/2012 18:47

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Classical Philology*.

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS (DIAGORAS OF MELOS,  
*APOPYRGIZONTES LOGOI?*):  
A NEW TRANSLATION

RICHARD JANKO

I. THE AIM AND OUTLOOK OF THE DERVENI AUTHOR

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS, our oldest surviving Greek manuscript, was discovered in the remains of a funeral pyre<sup>1</sup> almost forty years ago, in January 1962. Along with other bizarre and astounding material, it offers an allegorical interpretation of a cosmogonic poem ascribed to Orpheus. It is a text of capital importance for understanding the religious and philosophical crisis of the late fifth century B.C.E., when polytheism was challenged by monotheism and pantheism. The papyrus' final publication is still awaited, although the difficult and painstaking work of putting together the over 200 carbonized fragments, recovered by the use of static electricity, appears, according to what has been published, to be largely complete.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, considerably more can be done to interpret what is already known of the papyrus, especially since the recent publication of a greatly improved text of its opening.<sup>3</sup> The excellent supplements there offered prove that this text is a work of the sophistic enlightenment, by clarifying its attitude to mystery cult and traditional Greek religion in general.<sup>4</sup> In offering a translation based on my own restorations of the original Greek, I shall argue three propositions, which are wholly independent of each other:

For help in developing the ideas in this article I wish to thank audiences at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa and the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and in particular Luigi Battezzato, Jan Bremmer, Patricia Crone, Franco Ferrari, Maria Serena Funghi, Salvatore Lavecchia, Glenn Most, and Heinrich von Staden. I am also most grateful to Alan Griffiths and Michele Hannoosh for their insights, and to the Institute for the fellowship that gave me the time to finish this piece. Responsibility for its contents remains mine.

1. It is possible that this find-spot has no religious significance, since papyrus was a convenient combustible material, like newspaper, and was used for pyres: cf. Mart. 10.97.1, *arsura struitur Libitina papyro*, cf. 8.44.11, both cited by S. G. Kapsomenos, "Ὁ Ὀρφικὸς πάπυρος τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης," *AD* 19 A (1964): 16–25, at p. 16, n. 1. Differently, e.g., G. W. Most, "The Fire Next Time: Cosmology, Allegoresis, and Salvation in the Derveni Papyrus," *JHS* 117 (1997): 117–35, at pp. 117, 130–35; A. Laks, "Between Religion and Philosophy: The Function of Allegory in the Derveni Papyrus," *Phronesis* 42 (1997): 121–42, at 141.

2. In a notice by K. Tsantsanoglou and G. M. Parássoglou (with E. Turner), its editors predicted that their work would be completed by mid-1984 (*Gnomon* 54 [1982]: 855–56).

3. K. Tsantsanoglou, "The First Columns of the Derveni Papyrus and their Religious Significance," in *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, ed. A. Laks and G. Most (Oxford, 1997 [hereafter, Laks and Most]), 93–128.

4. On this topic see Most, "Fire Next Time" and Laks, "Between Religion and Philosophy" (n. 1 above), esp. pp. 125–26, 134–40 of the latter.

*Classical Philology* 96 (2001): 1–32

[© 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved] 0009-837X/00/9601-0001\$02.00

(1) Its author wrote his treatise in order to argue that conventional religious belief and practice, which may seem shocking or bizarre if taken literally, need to be interpreted allegorically in order to reconcile them with the latest science of his day.

(2) Its outlook matches exactly what has been reconstructed, on the basis of other considerations, as the attitude of the thinker who, in my view, wrote it, the notorious “atheist” Diagoras of Melos, who was not in fact an “atheist” in any modern sense, but a sophist like Critias or Prodicus.

(3) The condemnation of Diagoras by the Athenians in 415 B.C.E. for defaming the Eleusinian mysteries was part of the fierce religious reaction against contemporary philosophy and science, which included accusations against Anaxagoras and would culminate in those against Socrates; this reaction affected the thought of followers of Anaxagoras, like Diogenes of Apollonia, and even more that of later philosophers, from Plato and Isocrates onwards.

Let us first consider its author’s aim. It is my contention that he sets out to criticize most of his contemporaries on the ground that they believed too literally in the rites and holy texts of traditional religion. According to him, both Orpheus (in col. VII) and Heraclitus (in col. IV) compose allegories about the secrets of nature and of God; his term for this is *ἱερολογεῖσθαι* (see below). In the Orphic cosmogony, the allegory runs “from the first word to the last”; it was fully intended by the poet, as is proved by his opening verse, where he declared that he was writing only for the “pure in hearing” (col. VII). The chosen are few indeed, since not even the priests can explain the rites and sacred texts to those whom they initiate (col. XX): this is because they do not explain them as allegories. To prove his point, the author (very plausibly) interprets the sacrifices to the Erinyes and the Eumenides allegorically, as attempts to appease the souls of the angry dead (in cols. I–III, VI), claims that Heraclitus was allegorizing when he spoke of the Erinys (col. IV), and (totally implausibly) offers a lengthy allegorical explanation of Orpheus’ cosmogonic poem (in cols. VII–XIX, XXI–XXVI), pausing in col. XX to remind us of his purpose. Since people lack so credible an explanation, they risk losing their faith, because they do not understand such apparently bizarre rites and texts. This is why, he argues, they do not believe in the terrors of Hades, because they take visions and oracles literally (col. V); the author, of course, can explain them allegorically. His methods of exegesis, namely etymology and allegory, are those of the sophistic enlightenment, so mocked by Aristophanes. During his epideixis he pauses from time to time to remind the audience of his main thesis (in cols. IV–V, VII, and XX). These columns, far from being digressions, as they have always been understood, are in fact the kernel of the treatise; the rest of it consists of the proofs that he offers to support his argument. His claim that material that presents difficulties for conventional piety must be interpreted allegorically puts him in a tradition that goes back as far as Theagenes of Rhegium (c. 525 B.C.E.), who advanced an allegorical interpretation in terms of the physical elements to defend Homer’s *Battle of the Gods*;<sup>5</sup> this

5. This is wrongly doubted by L. Brisson (*Sauver les mythes* [Paris, 1996], 55), since he misdates Theagenes to earlier in the century.

was probably in response to Xenophanes' critique (DK 21 B 1). Like Xenophanes, the author also adopts a monotheistic viewpoint, as K. Tsantsanoglou has noted,<sup>6</sup> since he refers to gods in the plural only when discussing popular belief.

The crucial verb *ἱερολογεῖσθαι* and noun *ἱερολόγος* appear in columns IV and VII, describing Heraclitus and Orpheus respectively. Both D. Sider and K. Tsantsanoglou have suggested that these words mean "speak in allegories" and "allegorist," citing parallels in Herennius Philo (first century C.E.), Lucian, and Damascius.<sup>7</sup> In columns IX and XIII our author alleges that Orpheus speaks "in riddles" to reveal the nature of reality, and in column XXV he claims that Orpheus composed some verses "as an obstacle, since he does not want everyone to understand." One may compare the commentator on Alcman, who claims that Alcman *φυσιολογεῖ* or is a *φυσικός*, an "allegorist"; Alcman tells a myth that the commentator deems an allegory of creation, as G. W. Most saw, showing that *φυσικός* has this sense.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, Alan Griffiths reminds me that Herodotus uses *ἰρὸς λόγος* to refer to an explanation of religious practices that, as he once states, is revealed only to initiates (2.51.4, 62.2, 81.2); Plato's *Seventh Letter* applies the phrase to ancient doctrines about rewards and punishments after death (335a).

What kind of person could have written such a treatise? W. Burkert was the first to argue that the system of physics found in the Derveni papyrus depends on the thought of Anaxagoras and of Diogenes of Apollonia, and that it uses expressions reminiscent of the atomists; he recognized in the author a late representative of Pythagoreanism, with doctrines resembling those of Epphantus (DK 51).<sup>9</sup> Burkert dated the text to the period 420–400, and ascribed it to one of the intellectuals of the time.<sup>10</sup> More precisely, I have shown, with arguments that cannot be repeated here, that the physical doctrines in this treatise are extremely close to those of Diogenes of Apollonia.<sup>11</sup> Diogenes was a follower of Anaxagoras. He blended his master's doctrine of *Nous* with terms and theories from the systems of Heraclitus and the atomist Leucippus to form a system combining teleological pantheism and material monism: all things are pervaded by Air, which is Zeus, which is Mind, and this deity has arranged all things for the best. The very same doctrines are presented in the papyrus; they tally almost exactly with those of Diogenes, down to the eclectic mixture of the views of the same three predecessors. Diogenes also employed the methods of allegory and etymology that are so prominent in the papyrus.

6. Tsantsanoglou, "First Columns" (n. 3 above), at 99.

7. Tsantsanoglou, "First Columns," at 122–23 (he cites Lucian *Syr. D.* 26 and *Astr.* 10); and D. Sider, "Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus," in Laks and Most, 129–48, at p. 135, n. 17 (he cites Herennius Philo, *FGH* 790 F 1.26, and Damascius *De princ.* 38). *θεολόγος* is well attested in this sense (R. D. Lambertson, *Homer the Theologian* [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986], 22–31).

8. "Alcman's 'cosmogonic' fragment," *CQ* 37 (1987): 1–19, at 7–9, on *P Oxy.* 2390 frag. ii, col. i 26 = frag. 5.2 Page.

9. "Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker," *A&A* 14 (1968): 93–114.

10. "Star Wars or One Stable World?" in Laks and Most, 167–74, at 174.

11. "The Physicist as Hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates, and the Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 118 (1997): 61–94, esp. 63–66, 80–87. The arguments offered here are supplementary to my thesis there. For the closeness of the treatise to Diogenes, see now W. Burkert, *Da Omero ai magi* (Venice, 1999), 108, 110–11.

However, it is not, I concluded, by Diogenes. Writing at the same time, A. Laks, who knows the thought of Diogenes better than anyone, pointed out an important divergence between Diogenes' system and that of the papyrus. Its author follows the pluralism of Anaxagoras in thinking that the things that exist independently of Mind, whereas Diogenes is a monist who holds that they are all modifications of a single primary substance, Air/Mind: "Air becomes the place where things evolve, rather than their 'substance' . . . Diogenes denies the absolute separation of Anaxagoras' intelligence in order to explain its capacity to act upon the other things: Intelligence is air's intelligence. But since all things are but modifications of air, this amounts to endorsing total immanence and hence sacrificing the transcendence of the first principle. . . . The acceptance of an Anaxagorean-like pluralism by the Derveni author goes together with a conception of divine air that makes it the *place* of everything (including, in some special sense, of intelligence), thus paradoxically preserving its transcendent status."<sup>12</sup>

I shall return to these questions after considering the author's attitude to mystery cult and its sacred texts. Its author probably pursued a purpose very similar to that of Heraclitus of Ephesus, while of course modernizing the philosophical doctrines by which he offered a "scientific" interpretation of rituals and sacred texts. Heraclitus derides traditional worship and mystery religion as mere ignorance.<sup>13</sup> In both style and content, Heraclitus is profoundly influenced by the mysteries,<sup>14</sup> and yet scorns both ordinary people and the religious establishment, and is ready to equate gods with each other in the case of Hades and Dionysus. Both moves are paralleled in our text. Consider the following fragments of Heraclitus' book (the second in a citation by Clement): "They are purified by being polluted with alien blood, just as if one washed by stepping into mud . . . They pray to statues, as if someone were to converse with houses, not understanding what gods or heroes are." "For whom does Heraclitus prophesy? 'For night-rangers: *magoi, bacchoi*, maenads, initiates.' For these he threatens what happens after death, for these he prophesies the fire; for 'the mysteries that are customarily performed among men are practiced in an unholy manner.'" "Were they not making a procession for Dionysus and singing a hymn to reverend things (*aidoia*, i.e., phalloi), they would be acting with utter irreverence. Hades and Dionysus, for whom they rave in madness, are the same."<sup>15</sup> It is no coincidence that the Derveni papyrus cites Heraclitus, I believe, twice: not only at column IV 8–10, but also at XI 8–9, an otherwise unattested fragment where his name is not given.

As W. K. C. Guthrie wrote, "Heraclitus was not hostile to initiations and Dionysiac *orgia* as such, but deplored the fact that they were carried out without any understanding of their true significance."<sup>16</sup> In just the same way

12. Laks, "Between Religion and Philosophy," 130–32, based on col. XVII of the papyrus.

13. See the comparisons by R. Seaford, "Immortality, Salvation, and the Elements," *HSCP* 90 (1986): 1–26, at 20–21; Sider, "Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus," 129–48; and D. Obbink, "Cosmology as Initiation vs. the Critique of the Orphic Mysteries," in Laks and Most, 39–54, at 46 and 53.

14. Cf. Seaford, "Immortality" (n. 13 above), 14–20.

15. DK 22 B 5, 14, 15. For the punctuation of B 14 see F. Graf, *Magic in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 21.

16. *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1962), 476.

the papyrus claims that the ordinary person, even when initiated, does not understand; he does not know, for instance, that all the different gods who are worshipped are one, namely Zeus, who is also Air and permeates all creation (cols. XVI–XIX); or, again, that evil spirits and the Furies are vengeful souls (cols. II, VI). The Derveni author is certain that he can decode all the riddles, whether those of ritual in the opening columns or those in the poem of Orpheus, who, he insists, conceals in his verses not “unbelievable riddles, but important truths in riddles,” which are aimed at only the few, not the many (col. VII); on the other hand, people undergoing initiation cannot even hear and understand at the same time (col. XX). Heracitus presents even his own *logos* as hard and riddling for ordinary people to understand, demanding a similar decoding: “people always fail to understand this discourse, both before they hear it and when they first hear it” (DK 22 B 1).

M. L. West has noted the oddity that the Derveni text combines a physical system of Ionian type with a “less rationalistic kind of concern with religious enlightenment.”<sup>17</sup> He boldly drew from this several deductions, which are, I believe, all correct: (1) “it was these religious interests that led to his acquaintance with the Orphic poem”; (2) “he was himself one of the initiates whose ritual acts he knows and interprets”; (3) “the Orphic poem may have been a sacred text of theirs, and likewise ‘the Hymns’ from which he quotes at one point”;<sup>18</sup> and (4) “perhaps he was writing for them, to introduce them to a Diogenean cosmology in which he had been instructed elsewhere.” Thus the author was no ordinary follower of the Orphic movement, but a highly sophisticated one and a schismatic as well.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, Orphics, religious experts, and sophists were overlapping categories at this date: the author appears to be at once a sophisticated Orphic and an Orphic sophist. What is most remarkable about him is the extraordinary mixture of piety and science; as Guthrie concluded, allegorical interpretation was an important part of the Orphic approach from an early date, even before Plato’s dismissive reference to the allegorical interpretation of improper myths about the gods, such as are fit to be revealed only during the mysteries (*Resp.* 3 378a–d).<sup>20</sup>

Scholars have rarely considered the likely effect on public opinion of such an interpretation, which sought to reconcile traditional religious belief and practice with the latest scientific progress.<sup>21</sup> Listeners receptive to the

17. *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford, 1983), 81.

18. D. Obbink has shown that, since the quotation of the “Hymns” of Orpheus in col. XXII recurs in Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 185), the Derveni papyrus was known to that writer (perhaps in his *Περὶ μαντικῆς* or *Περὶ θεῶν*), who is in his turn quoted by Philodemus in his *De Pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1428 frag. 3): see “A Quotation of the Derveni Papyrus in Philodemus’ *On Piety*,” *Cronache Ercolanesi* 24 (1994): 111–35; Burkert, *Da Omero ai magi* (n. 11 above), 79.

19. Cf. Laks and Most’s introduction (Laks and Most, 5).

20. *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London, 1952), pp. 161–63 with n. 4: “we have seen enough now to say that what may be called allegorical philology was a feature of Orphic speculation.” Guthrie cites the Orphic allegorizer in *Pl. Grg.* 493a–c, who says that he *μυθολογεῖ* (493d). Elsewhere (p. 63) he notes that, in the passage where Plato compares the true philosopher with the initiate (*Phd.* 69c), when those who conduct the *τελεταί* “say that the uninitiated will have an unpleasant lot in the next world, the religious teachers are speaking in riddles. In truth they are not such worthless teachers as men who try to force a literal meaning on their doctrines.” The Derveni author offers a similar argument (col. V).

21. For this diagnosis of his aim see Most, “Fire Next Time,” 119–25.

author's undertaking might well wonder whether they needed to go to all the trouble and expense of becoming initiated. The more literal-minded (or, we might say, "fundamentalist") among them may not have appreciated such "enlightened" views at all; and the priests, who had a real financial interest in the maintenance of a numerous clientele, might take a very dim view indeed. Two generations earlier, Heraclitus could apparently express such opinions without fear, but later in the fifth century hostility to the new religious enlightenment was profound and widespread in Athens, despite modern attempts to minimize the evidence. This hostility is depicted by Plutarch in his *Life of Nicias* (23.2–3):

The first man to put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines about the changing phases of the moon was Anaxagoras. But he was no ancient authority, nor was his doctrine in high repute. It was still under seal of secrecy (*ἀπόρρητος*), and made its way among a few only. . . . Men could not abide the natural philosophers (*φυσικοί*) and "visionaries" (*μετεωρολόεσται*), as they were then called, for that they reduced the divine agency down to irrational causes, blind forces, and necessary incidents. Even Protagoras had to go into exile. Anaxagoras was with difficulty rescued from imprisonment by Pericles, and Socrates, although he had nothing whatever to do with such matters, nevertheless lost his life because of philosophy. (trans. B. Perrin)

It was not this religious crisis but rather Tsantsanoglou's excellent restorations of the opening columns that led me to conclude that the Derveni papyrus is the work, not of a seer (as Tsantsanoglou inclines to believe), but of a sophist, and among sophists not of Diogenes, but of Diagoras.<sup>22</sup> We shall see that the career of Diagoras closely resembles the portrait of the author that West painted, that of someone who was familiar with the mysteries and with the Orphic poems, yet who gave them an interpretation based on Ionian physics and thus provoked the Athenians' anger. He departed so far from conventional faith in the gods that, during the great religious crisis of 415 B.C.E., they tried to have him executed for publishing the mysteries and deterring people from getting initiated.

#### DIAGORAS AS POET AND SOPHIST

A passage in the eleventh-century *Life of Zeno the Eleatic* by the Arab scholar Al-Mubaššir ibn Fatik, neglected until very recently, has greatly clarified the biography of Diagoras of Melos. He is likely to have been born in 469/8 B.C.E., since Al-Mubaššir's report that he spent 54 years at Pellene (T 10 Winiarczyk) is surely a mistake for a statement that he was aged 54 when he fled thither in 415/4. This is supported by the fact that his "floruit" is given as either 483/2 or 469/8, in the latter case by a synchronism with Bacchylides' greatest success (T 1–5, 9A Winiarczyk). Younger than Bac-

22. See Janko, "Physicist as Hierophant" (n. 11 above), 87–94. J. S. Rusten already related col. XX of the papyrus to Diagoras ("Interim Notes on the Derveni Papyrus," *HSCP* 89 [1985]: 121–40, at 140). On Diagoras see the excellent studies of M. Winiarczyk, *Diagorae Melii et Theodori Cyrenaei reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1981); cf. id., "Diagoras von Melos: Wahrheit und Legende," *Eos* 67 (1979): 191–213 (for his life), and *Eos* 68 (1980): 51–75 (on his works). These render obsolete those of F. Jacoby, "Diagoras ὁ ἄθεος," *Abhandlungen der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Kl. für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst* 1959, Abh. 3, and L. Woodbury, "The Date and Atheism of Diagoras of Melos," *Phoenix* 19 (1965): 178–211. See also D. Obbink, *Philodemus: "On Piety," Part I* (Oxford, 1996), 352–54.

chylides and Pindar, he was older than Melanippides of Melos, the lyric poet (T 9A Winiarczyk). If he was born in 469/8, he was Socrates' exact contemporary. Should he be the same as the Diagoras mocked for his height by Hermippus in his *Moirai* (frag. 43 Kassel-Austin), under the guise of "Diagoras the Quibbler" (Διαγόρου τοῦ Τερθρέως), he was already an object of comment in Athens before 430; the name is an extremely common one, but the verb τερθρεύω is used of both philosophers and religious "experts." He was an associate of Nicodemus, leader of the ruling democratic party in Mantinea circa 426–418, where he drew up the democratic constitution (T 11–12 Winiarczyk). Our sources describe him as both a lyric poet and a philosopher (or "natural philosopher" [φυσικός], T 1–3); Al-Mubaššir lists him with Presocratics who left written works, like Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Melissus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, as well as Socrates himself (T 10 Winiarczyk). Diagoras wrote a prose work obscurely entitled Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι (T 9, 67 Winiarczyk), which he presumably composed before 423 or at the latest circa 418, the date of the revised *Clouds*. This title resembles those of two prose works by sophists, namely Protagoras' Καταβάλλοντες λόγοι, "Knock-down Arguments" (DK 80 B 1),<sup>23</sup> and Thrasymachus' Ὑπερβάλλοντες [λόγοι], "Winning Arguments" (DK 85 B 7). The same sense is given by the title of Ion of Chios' cosmological prose work Τριαγμοί, in which Ion, who died shortly before 421, claimed that Pythagoras composed the ἱερὸς λόγος ascribed to Orpheus (*Orph. frag.* T 248 Kern); this title derives from τριάζω "throw down thrice, win," because in wrestling, the fighter who was thrown to the ground three times lost. It is possible that all these works were named after throws in that sport, although ὑπερβάλλειν is unattested in this sense, and ἀποπυργίζειν is wholly unknown; perhaps it meant "throw from a great height as from a tower," a hold in which the victim is lifted high up before being tossed to the ground. However, it might signify "Fortifying arguments" or "Walling-off arguments," in a metaphor from the siegecraft so prevalent during the Peloponnesian War; or, since the *Suda* cites the title under its entry πυργίσκοι, the name for a piece of furniture like a "chest," it is also possible that it denotes a work that had to be kept in a metaphorical "casket" and that circulated only in secret, just as Plutarch claims that works on natural science became ἀπόρητοι (*Nic.* 23.2).

Whatever this title means, we are told that in his book Diagoras explained his lapse from traditional religious faith.<sup>24</sup> After being very superstitious, he

23. This may be the work in which Protagoras expressed his famous agnosticism about matters divine, for which, the story goes, the Athenians exiled him and burned his books in the agora (Diog. Laert. 9.52, with L. Piccirilli, "Il primo autodafé letterario: il rogo di libri di Protagora," *SIFC* 15 [1997]: 17–23). Cf. the allusion in Euripides' *Bacchae*, where Tiresias, after claiming that οὐδὲν σοφισόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν, says of the ancestral beliefs as old as time, οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος (200–202, wrongly deleted by J. Diggle, *Euripidis Fabulae*, vol. 3 [Oxford, 1994]), before the seer offers "sophistic" arguments based on changing the names of the gods and identifying them with physical principles, just like the methodology of the papyrus. Elsewhere (Tatianus *Ad. Gr.* 27 = T 68 Winiarczyk; and Al-Mubaššir [n. 29 below]) Diagoras is said to have written the Φρύγιοι λόγοι, but this is clearly a later work, because it allegorized the names of Greek and Egyptian gods, including Sarapis (see T 93–98 Winiarczyk).

24. *Suda*, s.v. πυργίσκοι καὶ θησαυροφυλάκια· σκευὴ κατ' οἶκον. καὶ ἀποπυργίζω· Διαγόρας ἔγραψε τοὺς καλουμένους Ἀποπυργίζοντας λόγους, ἀναγώρῃσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔκπτωσιν ἔχοντας τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον δόξης· ἄθεος γὰρ (οὐκ) (supplevi) ἦν τὸ πρότερον (π 3200 Adler = T 67B Winiarczyk).

lost his faith when he saw a rival poet who had harmed him through perjury go unpunished by the gods.<sup>25</sup> We have further indications of the content of his work. Epicurus<sup>26</sup> tells us that Diagoras, like Prodicus and Critias, explained the nature of the gods by changing the letters in their names; Epicurus calls all three ἄθεοι, thus bracketing Diagoras with well-known sophists, just as he is associated elsewhere with Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Critias (T 14, 19–20, 23, 56–57 Winiarczyk). The reports that Diagoras was concerned with perjury and that he etymologized the names of the gods are in accord with Aristophanes' jab at Diagoras via Socrates "the Melian," who claims that one can no longer swear oaths by Zeus, since his rule has been supplanted by that of "Dinos."<sup>27</sup> The Christian apologist Athenagoras, well-informed about the seamier side of paganism, says that Diagoras revealed the Orphic *logos*, the Eleusinian mysteries, and those of the Cabiri.<sup>28</sup>

Thanks to the testimony of Al-Mubaššir, it is now certain that it was not in the 430s, as Jacoby imagined, but in the archonship of Charias (415/4 B.C.E.),<sup>29</sup> the year of the religious witch hunt in which the priests of Eleu-

25. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.53, in a catalogue of ἄθεοι resembling that in Epicurus (below): Διαγόρας δὲ ὁ Μῆλιος, διθυραμβοποιός, ὡς φασί, τὸ πρῶτον γενόμενος ὡς εἶ τις καὶ ἄλλος δεισιδαίμων· ὃς γε καὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἑαυτοῦ καθήρξατο τὸν τρόπον τούτον, "κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχαν (τὰ) πάντα (βροτοῖσιν ἐκ)τελεῖται". ἀδικηθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τινος ἐπιπορήσαντος καὶ μηδὲν ἔνεκα τούτου παθόντος μεθρημάστο εἰς τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι θεόν. The verses quoted are the same as in Aristoxenus given below. Sextus' list of ἄθεοι resembles that of Epicurus (see next note); perhaps both are from Eudemus of Rhodes' *Τῶν περὶ τοῦ θεῖου ἱστορία* (cf. Obbink, "On Piety" [n. 22 above], 352). Cf. the list in Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.117–19, where a list of "atheists," ending with Euhemerus, is at once followed by a reference to the Eleusinian mysteries and those of Samothrace and Lemnos, "whose interpretation and rationalization has more to do with natural science than with theology" (*quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura cognoscitur quam deorum*, 119). Evidence in Philodemus (see next n.) proves that such lists were current by the late fourth century B.C.E.

26. In Philodemus, *On Piety* Part I col. 19, lines 518–41, in Obbink, "On Piety." The passage runs: αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν μανίαν Ἐπίκουρος (frag. 87 Usener) ἐμ[έμ]νατο τοῖς τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]ροῦσιν, ὡς καὶ τῶν [τῶν] δωδεκάτωι Προδίκου καὶ Διαγόρου καὶ Κριτία κα[λλο]ις μ[ε]μφεται φᾶς πα[ρα]κόπτειν καὶ μ[α]ίνεσθαι, καὶ βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς [εἰ]κά[ζει], κε[λεύ]σ[ας] μὴ πράγμα(θ) (correcti post Gomperz) ἡμ[ε]ῖν παρέχειν μηδ' (οὐδ' N. correcti) ἐνοχλεῖν. κα[ὶ] γάρ] παραγραμμαῖς[ουσι] τὰ [τῶν] θεῶν [ὀνό]ματα, i.e., "Epicurus criticized those who eliminate the divine from existing things for their total insanity, as in Book 12 [of *On Nature*] he criticizes Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias among others, saying that they rave like lunatics, and he likens them to Bacchant revellers, admonishing them not to trouble or disturb us. For they explain the names of the gods by changing letters." My translation adapts Obbink's; the crucial supplements are his. This is also the first evidence that Prodicus and Critias practiced etymology to support their unique interpretations of the gods. Epicurus continues by criticizing Antisthenes' belief that a plurality of gods exists only by convention. The latter held that there is in fact only one god (cf. frag. 39A Declava Caizzi; Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.13.32); Antisthenes was, of course, Socrates' pupil. The Derveni papyrus repeatedly implies a similar belief.

27. *Clouds* 828–30 (= T 38 Winiarczyk):

Στ. Δίνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δι' ἐξεληλακός. . . .

Φε. τίς φησι ταῦτα;

Στ.

Σωκράτης ὁ Μῆλιος. . . .

28. Διαγόρα μὲν γὰρ εἰκότως ἐπεκάλου Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ μόνον τὸν Ὀρφικὸν εἰς μέσον κατατιθέντι λόγον καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἐλευσίῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν Καβίρων δημιούντι μυστήρια καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἵνα τὰς γογγύλας ἔφοι κατακόπτοντι ζόανον, ἀντικρὺς δὲ ἀποφανομένῳ μηδὲ ὄλωσ εἶναι θεόν (*Pro Christianis* 4 = T 27 Winiarczyk); on Athenagoras' sources see W. R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras: "Legatio" and "De Resurrectione"* (Oxford, 1972), xix–xxiii. Diagoras is linked with Samothrace in other sources (T 36–37, 59, 101), which contain serious inaccuracies and confusions.

29. The date is given by Diod. Sic. 13.6 (T 17 Winiarczyk) and Al-Mubaššir (T 10). The latter gives the archon's name as *Khāriyūs al-Arkūn*, i.e., Χαρίας ὁ ἀρχων (translation of G. J. van Gelder in J. N. Bremmer, "Religious Secrets and Secrecy in Classical Greece," in *Secrecy and Concealment*, ed. H. G. Kippenberg and G. G. Stroumsa [Leiden, 1995], 61–78, at 74–75). I thank Patricia Crone for confirming that the Arabic form of the name contains a letter that can be read as yod, although previous translations render it *Hārūs*. Al-Mubaššir used Porphyry's *Φιλόσοφος ἱστορία*, which gave many dates, relying on Apollodorus

sis played a major role,<sup>30</sup> that the Athenians outlawed Diagoras, who fled to Pellene in Achaea; both events inspire jokes in Aristophanes' *Birds* of spring 414.<sup>31</sup> We know three further details. The Athenians offered a bounty of one talent of silver if Diagoras the Melian were brought to them dead, and two if he were arrested alive; they sought him on the ground that he was making the Mysteries public, belittling them, and deterring many from becoming initiated; and he fled to Pellene when the other Peloponnesians had agreed to hand him over. We learn these details from two sources. The first is the *On the Mysteries at Eleusis* of the Atthidographer Melanthius (perhaps c. 350–270 B.C.E.), who adds that the Athenians also issued a proclamation against the people of Pellene who had refused to extradite him.<sup>32</sup> The other source, Craterus (third century), likewise quotes the decree from the bronze tablet on which it was inscribed, but supplies the Athenians' motives,<sup>33</sup> which closely match what we have learned above about the content of Diagoras' book.

Because Diagoras' exile has been generally misdated, and he is not included among the lists of those who parodied the Mysteries in 415, his condemnation has never been connected with that affair.<sup>34</sup> But it was no

---

(as Porphyry's name is absent, the fragment is omitted in A. Smith's Teubner). F. E. Romer, "Atheism, Impiety, and the *limos Melios* in Aristophanes' *Birds*," *AJP* 115 (1994): 351–65, at p. 354, n. 11, holds that the decree must have been issued a year or two previously, since Aristophanes shows that the proclamation made at the Dionysia against Diagoras and the tyrants had been made before (ἐπαναγορεύεται, *Av.* 1072), and the Dionysia happened only once a year. But curses against the tyrants opened each meeting of the Assembly also (cf. *Ar. Thesm.* 331–51), and we should instead deduce that the same ἐπικήρυγμα opened both the Assembly and the Dionysia, just as they opened both the Assembly and the Boule (P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* [Oxford, 1972], 36–37). By late in Charias' archonship the Athenians could have heard this often.

In a second article ("Diagoras the Melian [Diod. Sic. 13.6.7]," *CW* 89 [1995–96]: 393–401, at 397), Romer suggests that Craterus (*FGrH* 342 F 16) is the source of Schol. *Av.* 1073c, which says that this happened roughly around the time of the capture of Melos, but could have been earlier (ἐκκεκρήκται δὲ μάλιστα ἀπὸ τὴν ἄλωσιν τῆς Μήλου· οὐδὲν ἴγάρ κωλύει πρότερον). Craterus is quoted immediately before, but nothing proves that this suggestion derives from him. Conversely, Schol. 1073a says that Diagoras lived in Athens after the capture of Melos and used to disparage the Mysteries so as to deter many from the rites—hence the Athenians' proclamation; Melanthius is then cited (οὗτος μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν Μήλου ὄκει ἐν Ἀθήναις, τὰ δὲ μυστήρια εὐτέλιζεν ὡς πολλοὺς ἐκτρέπειν τῆς τελετῆς· τοῦτο οὖν ἐκήρυξαν κατ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἐν χαλκῇ στήλῃ ἔγραψαν, ὡς φησι Μελάνθιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ μυστηρίων, i.e., *FGrH* 326 F 3). R. Parker thinks the date 415 is an inference from the *Birds* (*Athenian Religion: A History* [Oxford, 1995], p. 208, n. 37).

30. See esp. Thuc. 8.53.2 and W. Furlley, *Andokides and the Herms*, *BICS* Suppl. 65 (London, 1996).

31. 1073 (= T 15) and 1421 (= T 84): μὴ εὐθὺ Πελλήνης πέτεσθαι διανοεῖ; On this latter joke as a reference to Diagoras see Romer, "Atheism" (n. 29 above), 355–56; this is wrongly doubted by N. Dunbar, *Aristophanes' "Birds"* (Oxford, 1995), ad loc. (that the scholiasts failed to understand it proves nothing). Diagoras' escape to Pellene is reported by Melanthius and Al-Mubassir (T 7A, 10); the *Suda's* claim that he died in Corinth (T 9A) is owed to a confusion with Diagoras of Eretria (T 89–90).

32. Schol. *Av.* 1073a, c, citing *FGrH* 326 F 3, where we should read ἐπικήρυξαν (codd.: ἐξ- Wilamowitz) καὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς (οὐκ) (inserui: μὴ add. Wilamowitz, Fritzsche) ἐκδιδόντας Πελλανεῖς. The supplement μὴ would imply that the decree would only take effect if the Pellonians did not extradite him; οὐκ is also palaeographically superior. The scholia to *Ran.* 320 (T 8 Winiarczyk) say that "the other Peloponnesians" were persuaded to extradite him; this confirms that some Peloponnesians refused to do so. Differently C. Higbie, "Craterus and the Use of Inscriptions in Ancient Scholarship," *TAPA* 129 (1999): 43–83, at 51–52.

33. Schol. *Av.* 1073b, citing *FGrH* 342 F 16: τὰ μυστήρια πᾶσι διηγείτο, κοινοποιῶν αὐτὰ καὶ μικρὰ ποίων καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους μυσέσθαι ἀποτρέπων.

34. Thus Furlley, *Andokides* (n. 30 above), omits all mention of it, even though it fits well into his reconstruction of events; he also misses the importance of Cleonymus and Pisander, who proposed the huge rewards for those who informed on profaners of the Mysteries (*Andoc.* 1.27), and are major targets in the *Birds*, where Pisander is directly linked with Socrates (1553–64, with T. K. Hubbard, *The Mask of Comedy* [Ithaca and London, 1991], 177).

isolated incident. Diodorus states simply that he was driven out “while these things were going on,” that is, the religious turmoil of 415/4 generally. But he adds that Diagoras “the so-called ἄθεος was slandered for impiety and feared the people,” thus evincing skepticism about the accusation that he was actually impious.<sup>35</sup> His doubt is in itself significant, since it implies that Diodorus, or his source, had information about Diagoras’ beliefs, and that these were not therefore particularly hard to ascertain. He does not place him among those who performed parodies of the Mysteries. Diagoras was never tried, but was condemned by a vote of the Assembly—an action redolent of the hysteria of 415, which even led to a lifting of the ban on torturing citizens (*Andoc. De mysteriis* 43). He could not have been included in the proceedings against the “profaners” of the Mysteries, because, as a metic, he could not have owned real property that could be confiscated like that of Athenians accused of this offense. One of the latter, Andocides, is explicitly compared with Diagoras by his prosecutor in 400/399, but with the difference that, whereas the latter profaned the Mysteries “in word,” Andocides did so “in deed.”<sup>36</sup> Since the speaker continues by arguing that the accused showed the Greeks that he “does not believe in gods,” he clearly expects the jury to accept that Diagoras was an ἄθεος.

T. K. Hubbard’s detailed and attractive interpretation of Aristophanes’ *Birds* as a necessarily veiled commentary on the religious crisis of 415/4 hardly refers to Diagoras, because Hubbard accepted Jacoby’s erroneous dating of Diagoras’ condemnation to 433/2.<sup>37</sup> But B. Katz had already proposed that *Birds* 1576, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποτειχίσας, and the play’s main idea of blocking the gods, were inspired by Diagoras’ book title Ἀποπυργίζοντες λόγοι,<sup>38</sup> and F. E. Romer has now argued that the whole plot of this drama was inspired by the writings and condemnation of Diagoras as well as by the fate of his fellow Melians.<sup>39</sup> This approach to an otherwise most puzzling play deserves to be taken further.<sup>40</sup>

Diagoras’ offense against the Eleusinian Mysteries, as well as the fact that he was a dithyrambic poet, was still recalled in 405 in Aristophanes’

35. τούτων δὲ πραττομένων Διαγόρας ὁ κληθεὶς ἄθεος, διαβολῆς τυχὼν ἐπ’ ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὸν δῆμον, ἐφυγεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς· οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ ἀνελόντι Διαγόραν ἀργυρίου τάλατον ἐπεκέρυσαν (*Diod. Sic.* 13.6.7).

36. τοσοῦτο δ’ οὗτος [sc. Andocides] Διαγόρου τοῦ Μηλίου ἀσεβέστερος γεγένηται· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ περὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἱερά καὶ εορτὰς ἤσβετο, οὗτος δὲ ἔργῳ περὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει. ὀργίσεσθαι οὖν χρή, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς ἀστοῖς ἀδικοῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ξένοις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀλλοτρίων ἔστιν ἀμάρτημα, τὸ δ’ οἰκειόν. καὶ μὴ ὡς μὲν ἔχετε ἀδικούντας ἀφίετε, τοὺς δὲ φευγόντας ζητεῖτε συλλαμβάνειν, ἐπικηρύττοντες τάλατον ἀργυρίου δάσειν τῷ ἀπάγοντι ἢ ἀποκτείναντι ([*Lysias*] 6.17–18 = T 16 Winarczyk). The speaker is either Epichares or Socrates’ accuser Meletus (see n. 42 below).

37. *Mask of Comedy* (n. 34 above), 158–82 and esp. p. 175, n. 48, relying on Jacoby, “Diagoras” (n. 22 above).

38. “The *Birds* of Aristophanes and Politics,” *Athenaeum* 54 (1976): 353–81, at 372–73. This need not conflict with other suggestions about what the title means; once coined, it would be open to comic reinterpretation.

39. “Atheism.” J. N. Bremmer similarly suggests that, angered by the “First Fruits decree,” which compelled the allies to send first fruits to Eleusis during the Mysteries, and by the recent sack of Melos, Diagoras revealed the Mysteries as a political protest (“Religious Secrets” [n. 29 above], 74–75). However, the evidence of *Clouds* 830 (cited above, n. 27) suggests that he had already done so years earlier.

40. The objections to Hubbard’s approach advanced by D. M. MacDowell (*Aristophanes and Athens* [Oxford, 1995], 223–24) are far from decisive, given Furlley’s new insights into the crisis of 415 (n. 30 above).

*Frogs*.<sup>41</sup> In 399 a certain Meletus, surely the same person who brought Socrates to trial the same year, took part in a prosecution of Andocides for impiety. In his speech, which survives in the Lysianic corpus, he assumes that his audience is still familiar with Diagoras' case, and takes it for granted that Diagoras was an ἄθεος who οὐ νομίζει θεούς, like Andocides.<sup>42</sup> It does not of course follow from this that Diagoras was an atheist in the modern sense, since the Athenians designated by the same term ἄθεος those who believed in new gods, only one god, or no god at all;<sup>43</sup> Socrates, I believe, fell victim to this same confusion, or rather obfuscation, on his enemies' part. Hubbard has convincingly argued that, in the *Birds*, Aristophanes associates Socrates closely with both the novel religious movement and the repression that were targeted by the play.<sup>44</sup> We can rely on neither the judgment of the Athenian jury, nor the statements of philosophers like Epicurus, who alleged that Diagoras denied the existence of any god: later philosophers who wished to teach in Athens had much to fear from the suggestion that their theology resembled his in any way, even if it did—and I suspect that it often did. The author of the Derveni papyrus could easily have penned Epicurus' celebrated formulation that "gods such as the many believe in do not exist. . . . The impious person is not he who abolishes the gods of the many, but he who applies the beliefs of the many to gods."<sup>45</sup> It is not for nothing that Pentheus, at *Bacchae* 995, is called ἄθεος for opposing the new god Dionysus; Euripides' play exposes the ruthless intolerance of the religious fundamentalism that the poet had seen for himself in the Athens of 415.

As R. Parker has written, the Athenians rarely acted against verbal impiety against the gods, but had one main fear: "that of the 'atheist' scientist, who

41. Line 320 (= T 8 Winiarczyk): ἄδουσι γοῦν τὸν Ἰακχὸν ὄνερ Διαγόρας. The ironic reference to both aspects of Diagoras' activity, poetry and the mysteries, was correctly explained by Aristarchus in the scholia ad loc. The joke is missed by K. J. Dover in his edition (*Aristophanes: "Frogs"* [Oxford, 1993], ad loc.). For Diagoras' poetry (PMG 738) see Aristoxenus cited by Philodemus *On Piety* Part II in *PHerc.* 1428 col. 11.7–15 = p. 85 Gomperz = p. 122 Schober (= Diagoras T 69 Winiarczyk). Aristoxenus (frag. 127a Wehrli), finding in his poetry nothing impious but only endorsements of divine providence like "it is god, god who wields his highest wisdom for every mortal act" or "by god and τύχη all things come to pass for mortals," denies that Diagoras wrote the prose work ascribed to him. But there is no reason to accept this, since the passages are compatible with Diagoras' having been a teleological monotheist, his change in attitude is attested elsewhere, and as a philosopher Aristoxenus would have had good reason to wish that Diagoras had not been condemned (see Janko, "Physicist as Hierophant," 90–94).

42. [Lysias] 6.17–18 = T 16 Winiarczyk (cited above, n. 36). In favor of this identification of the speaker, who must be either Meletus or Epichares (Andoc. *De mysteriis* 92–94), see K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 78–80. The author of this speech was a grandson of an Eleusinian hierophant ([Lys.] 6.54), and the trial was conducted before a jury consisting entirely of initiates (Andoc. *De Myst.* 29).

43. On the sense of ἄθεος see Obbink, "On Piety," 1–2, 12–15; M. L. McPherran, *The Religion of Socrates* (University Park, Pa., 1996), p. 88, n. 13 and p. 130. Cf. the protest of Clement of Alexandria that those who perform the mysteries are the true ἄθεοι, whereas Diagoras and others who rejected the traditional religion were called ἄθεοι (*Protr.* 2, pp. 20–21 P.). Glen Bowersock reminds me that the Emperor Julian, who certainly knew that the Christians were not atheists, still calls them ἄθεοι.

44. *Mask of Comedy*, 178–80.

45. *Ep. Men.* 123: [θεοί] οἴους αὐτοῦς (οἱ) πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν . . . ἀσεβῆς δ' οὐχ ὁ τοῦς τῶν πολλῶν θεοῦ ἀναρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων. Cf. the Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease*, which argues that it is not the rationalizing doctors who are ἀσεβεῖς but the *magoi*, since the latter claim to have power to control the gods and in so doing deny their existence (3); in using purifications and incantations they do an ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀθεώτατον πρῆγμα (4).

substitutes chance and necessity for the gods as an explanation of celestial phenomena.<sup>46</sup> Anaxagoras was certainly regarded as such a scientist. His successors, cowed by the Athenians' hostility as evinced by the decree that Diopieithes proposed, adopted a less overt approach, seeking to explain the latest science in terms of an elevated form of religion, as does the Derveni treatise. Even this was not acceptable, and may well have inflamed public passions further, if indeed we have before us Diagoras' effort to reconcile science and religion by means of allegory and etymology, and thereby to explain morally unacceptable myths like those in the Orphic cosmogony.

The hostile reaction to such efforts led the next generation of sophists and philosophers to become both more circumspect and more bold. It was no good explaining away the bizarre myths in Homer and other poets by using the allegorical and etymological method favored by the Derveni author and similar characters claiming special knowledge of the divine intent, as Euthyphro does;<sup>47</sup> instead, the traditional poetic canon needed to be rejected altogether. This process was probably begun, following the precedent of Xenophanes, by the historical Socrates with that skeptical questioning of the poets to which he refers in the *Apology* (22a-c). It continues not only in Plato, who notoriously proposes to censor traditional poetry in his ideal state (*Resp.* 2-3), but also in Isocrates. The latter, replying in 391/0 B.C.E. to Polycrates' pamphlet endorsing the condemnation of Socrates, protects himself by throwing the charge of impiety back at the poets, and especially at Orpheus, for saying utterly shameful things about the gods; he notes that many poets were horribly punished for what they said by poverty, blindness, exile, or, in Orpheus' case, being torn apart, and insists that he would have nothing to do with such teachings or those who promulgate them.<sup>48</sup> Now that we know that this poem of Orpheus told of Zeus swallowing a penis, fighting his father, swallowing Metis, and raping his mother and his sister, Isocrates' vehemence seems fully apt. Another reply to Polycrates' pamphlet, the *Apology of Socrates* by Libanius, defends Socrates at length for criticizing the poets, showing that they had themselves advocated out-

46. *Athenian Religion* (n. 29 above), 210-11.

47. See McPherran, *Religion of Socrates* (n. 43 above), 29-82.

48. *Bus.* 38-40. The passage is so apposite that it is worth quoting: ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις . . . , οἱ . . . τοιοῦτους λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν εἰρηκασιν οἴους οὐδεὶς ἂν περὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἴπειν τολμήσειεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κλοπᾶς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις θητείας αὐτοῖς ἀνεΐδισαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παίδων βρώσεως καὶ πατέρων ἐκτομᾶς καὶ μητέρων δεσμοῦς καὶ πολλὰς ἄλλας ἀνομίας κατ' αὐτῶν ἐλογοποίησαν. ὑπὲρ ὧν τὴν μὲν ἀξίαν δίκην οὐκ ἔδοσαν· οὐ μὴν ἀτιμώρητοί γε διέφυγον, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλῆται καὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐνδεδεῖς κατέστησαν, οἱ δ' ἐτυφλώθησαν, ἄλλος δὲ φεύγων τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοῖς οἰκειοτάτοις πολεμῶν ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον διετέλεσεν, Ὀρφεὺς δ' ὁ μάλιστα τούτων τῶν λόγων ἀψάμενος διασπασθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν. ὥστ', ἦν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ μμηρόσμεθα τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων, οὐδὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κακῆγορίας νομοθετήσομεν, τῆς δ' εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς παρρησίας ὀλιγορήσομεν, ἀλλὰ φυλαξόμεθα καὶ νομιούμεν ὁμοίως ἀσεβεῖν τοὺς τε λέγοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτοῖς. Cf. Pl. *Euthphr.* 6a-b, with n. 49 below. Isocrates' earlier praise of Pythagoras as a pupil of the pious Egyptians, and as one who educated the young with the full approval of their relatives (28-29), is also notable, since Herodotus claims that the practices called Orphic and Bacchic were actually Egyptian and Pythagorean (2.81); Isocrates is surely offering a covert defense of Socrates as someone not only condemned for corrupting the young, but also suspected of Pythagorean beliefs. For similar praise of Pythagoras see Libanius' *Apology* (*Decl.* 1.158); the coincidence shows that Polycrates (and the real Anytus?) had alluded to him. Cf. T. Ebert, "Sokrates als Pythagoreer und die Anamnesis in Platons *Phaidon*," *Akad. der Wiss. und der Lit. zu Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Kl.*, Jahrg. 1994, Abh. 13, 1-20; McPherran, *Religion of Socrates*, 135. Unfortunately we have lost Lysias' speech *On behalf of Socrates against Polycrates* (frag. 113 Thalheim), which also replied to Polycrates.

rageous behavior (*Decl.* 1.62–126). Moreover, Libanius indicates that Polycrates' "Anytus" accused Socrates of resembling the "sophists" (Libanius' term) Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Diagoras, with whom the Athenians were angry (*Decl.* 1.153 = T 23 Winiarczyk): "Anaxagoras was justly imprisoned for his impiety regarding the sun and moon; you banished Protagoras fairly and appropriately for asking whether the gods exist or not; you were wise to promise a reward for the person who would kill Diagoras, since he mocked Eleusis and the ineffable mysteries; but who is able to say that there is a book or an argument about the gods by Socrates that is contrary to law?" (*Decl.* 1.154–55 = T 19 Winiarczyk). Thus it is not "merely" a joke when Socrates moots the possibility that a critic of certain myths of divine conflict might be prosecuted for impiety (*Euthphr.* 6a);<sup>49</sup> jokes are often an outlet for truths that cannot openly be stated. Neither Isocrates nor Plato leaves open the possibility that allegorical explanations could render the poetry acceptable, and Plato explicitly rejects this move (*Resp.* 3.378d–e, *Phdr.* 229c–230a).

The Diogenean "heresy" was peculiarly liable to be understood as "atheism," since Diogenes equated God with a material principle, Air, as does the papyrus. So did Diagoras of Melos, since Aristophanes quips that Socrates "the Melian" thought Zeus had been deposed by "Dinos" (Mr. Vortex).<sup>50</sup> Indeed, the Socrates of the *Clouds* presents his novel doctrines as a great mystery into which his pupils must be initiated. On this evidence, and that of Plato's *Phaedo* 97b–98b, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, at some time before or during the late 420s, Socrates too accepted a teleological adaptation of the doctrines of Anaxagoras, and that this former belief played a part in his condemnation.<sup>51</sup> K. J. Dover has argued against the Athenians' persecution of other intellectuals, holding that the condemnation

49. So Parker, *Athenian Religion*, p. 211 with n. 48; but he is right to note that the issue is raised "to stress the division between true Socratic piety and the traditional version, in fact impious, that has presumed to arraign him . . . The truly dangerous innovators in religion . . . are *soi-disant* experts such as Euthyphro." Numenius already took the passage to mean that Plato, wishing to criticize scandalous stories about the gods but afraid of being executed like Socrates, ridiculed them by making the laughable theologian (we might say "religious fanatic") Euthyphro accept them (frag. 23 Des Places). Euthyphro was, of course, an exponent of etymology, as we learn in the *Cratylus* (396d, 399a, 399e). In the *Euthyphro* Plato seems keen to distance Socrates from such figures; however, if D. Sedley is right to argue that his intent in the *Cratylus* is in fact serious, then it follows, as he suggests, that Plato may have taken Euthyphro's etymological expertise seriously ("The Etymologies in Plato's *Cratylus*," *JHS* 118 [1998]: 140–54, at 147). For the counterargument that Plato sought to discredit the etymological method of the Derveni treatise see F. Casadesús Bordoy, "Nueva interpretación del *Crátilo* platónico a partir de las aportaciones del papiro de Derveni," *Emerita* 68 (2000): 53–71.

50. *Clouds* 828–30, cited above, n. 27. Similarly Diagoras' contemporary Hippon of Samos or Rhegium was accused of impiety by Cratinus in his *Panoptae* (PCG F 167 Kassel-Austin = DK 38 A 2); other sources say that he was called "atheist" because he made water the first principle of the universe and acknowledged nothing other than what we can perceive (A 4, 8, 9). In his very important attack on true atheism in *Laws* 10 Plato equates it with scientific materialism; he links it with early theogonies that posit a material principle prior to the existence of god and speak of conflict among the gods (886b–e)—these are a source of "ignorance" (ἀμαθία). The Derveni treatise makes the same point about the tales of Hades (e.g., col. IV).

51. McPherran argues (*Religion of Socrates*, 105–8), following the important work of P. A. Vander Waerdt ("Socrates in the *Clouds*," in *The Socratic Movement*, ed. P. A. Vander Waerdt [Ithaca, 1994], 48–86), that Socrates had an early interest in such views and held the Diogenean teleological argument for the existence of god that Xenophon ascribes to him (*Religion of Socrates*, 272–91, cf. A. E. Taylor, *Socrates* [London, 1951], 51–74); his conclusions on Socrates' religious outlook, very similar to my own, were unknown to me when I first assigned the Derveni papyrus to Diagoras (Janko, "Physicist as Hierophant," 92–94). However, although McPherran regards Diagoras as a sophist and compares him with Socrates (114), he does not doubt that he was a complete atheist (130, 285).

of Socrates was an isolated event.<sup>52</sup> However, even if some of the tales of court cases are contradictory and unreliable, there remains enough evidence to show that an anti-intellectual climate existed and was focused on “atheism”; any reader of the *Clouds* with a sense of humor will find it difficult not to take its ending very seriously.

The reasons why certain intellectuals felt the cold winds of popular hostility were varied, of course, but fear of “atheism” will have been a paramount factor. Some of Socrates’ jury certainly condemned him for political motives;<sup>53</sup> thus the moderate politician Anytus probably prosecuted him as a Laconizing pro-oligarch and menace to the restored democracy, whose sophistical teachings corrupted the youth (cf. Pl. *Meno* 91c–92b); Aeschines says flatly that he was condemned because he had educated Critias (1.173). However, others certainly felt threatened for religious reasons;<sup>54</sup> the poet Meletus attacked him as one who had introduced new gods that had not been approved by the city, although, according to Plato, he modified his accusation in court into one of outright atheism.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps, too, attack from behind the screen of religion was a convenient form of defense for some who had been involved in the misdeeds of the Thirty: thus Andocides (*De mysteriis* 94) could claim that Meletus was involved in the murder of Leon of Salamis under their régime,<sup>56</sup> a crime in which Plato’s Socrates states that he quietly refused to share (*Ap.* 32c–d), even though he too had remained in the city with the oligarchic party. Another of Andocides’ accusers, Epichares, was an agent of the Thirty (*Andoc. De mysteriis* 95). We should not expect any one explanation to suffice: Socrates was challenged by a formidable combination of adversaries with different motives, and even so he might not have been condemned had he not offered so uncom-

52. “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society,” *Talanta* 7 (1976): 25–54 (= *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2 [Oxford, 1988], 135–58). G. Kerferd (*The Sophistic Movement* [Cambridge, 1981], p. 21, n. 7) rightly calls Dover’s argument “excessively sceptical.” Much of the confusion over what actually happened, on which Dover bases his argument, is likely to go back to Athenian law-court speeches, which are notoriously inaccurate about historical details. Moreover, Polycrates’ pamphlet probably mentioned the charges against Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Diagoras, and Damon, since these are cited in Libanius’ rebuttal of it (*Apology = Decl.* 1.153–57). Intellectuals who have never experienced persecution seem to find it hard to believe that it can occur even in a democracy, if the society offers no legal protection for freedom of thought and expression like the Bill of Rights. For an invaluable corrective see M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley, 1986), 275–90. H. Yunis believes that we must accept that Anaxagoras was attacked on religious grounds, even if he was never condemned, and that Diopiteus offered a proposal outlawing his type of teaching, even if it was not enacted (*A New Creed: Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama* [Göttingen, 1988], 66–72); see also McPherran, *Religion of Socrates*, p. 270, n. 246. R. Wallace supports Dover’s arguments, denying the trial of Anaxagoras, but concedes that Protagoras did leave Athens under a cloud soon after 421, at a time of the popular suspicion of intellectuals that is documented by the *Clouds*, Ameipsias’ *Connus* of 423, and Eupolis’ *Flatterers* of 421, frag. 157 Kassel-Austin (“Private Lives and Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens,” in *Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology*, ed. A. L. Boegehold and A. Scafuro [Baltimore, 1994], 127–55, at 134–35). R. Parker (*Athenian Religion*, 199–217) seeks a middle course.

53. See I. F. Stone (*The Trial of Socrates* [London, 1988]). The fact that Libanius’ *Apology* deals with Socrates’ association with Alcibiades and Critias (*Decl.* 1.136–52) confirms that Polycrates, if not Anytus, had raised the question at his trial (cf. T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* [Princeton, 1989], 77–87).

54. See McPherran, *Religion of Socrates*, esp. 169–74, and R. Garland, *Introducing New Gods: The Politics of Athenian Religion* (London, 1992), 136–51.

55. So McPherran, *Religion of Socrates*, 119–44, who rightly argues that Socrates had not failed to observe civic cult (77–78); contra Garland, *New Gods* (n. 54 above).

56. See Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty* (n. 52 above), 494–95.

promising a defense. In any case, the Derveni papyrus has the power to reveal to us a largely unsuspected Greek equivalent to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, with its own share of inquisitors, exiles, and martyrs.

#### ON THIS TRANSLATION

The Derveni papyrus has left the scholarly community almost completely baffled. As Most has observed, “reading and supplementing it require a rare combination of ingenuity, erudition and foolhardiness.”<sup>57</sup> Armed with a definite hypothesis as to its purpose, school, and author, I offer below a new translation of it. The lack of such a hypothesis, the style of the original, and its incomplete publication, have all seriously hindered previous efforts to follow its argument. By later standards it is very ill written indeed, and seems to antedate the influence of Antiphon, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and even Herodotus (this means only that its author developed his style without their influence, and does not suffice to date him to the mid-fifth century). The use of Ionic dialect with an admixture of Attic and a few Doric forms well fits my theory that Diagoras wrote it.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, no fourth-century author could have composed a work like this.<sup>59</sup> There is much asyndeton; the lack of systematic connection between sentences by the use of particles is typical of early prose down to the last decade or two of the fifth century. Thus it has often seemed unclear when to render δὲ as “but” and when to ignore it. The author does not follow the usual later forms of constructions like “not only . . . but also.” He also appears to be writing in an unfamiliar genre; not only the commentary, but prose itself, seems to come to him only with difficulty. He often omits the definite article where later prose would employ it, and rarely uses it to mark words that we would put between quotation marks; this has caused confusion. So has a failure always to recognize when he is using λέγω with the sense “mean” rather than “say,” and ὅπως as “that,” as in Herodotus, rather than “how.” For the English to read intelligibly, we also need on occasion to translate as pluperfects not only aorists in subordinate clauses but even the past tense of εἶμι, and to supply punctuation and quotation marks freely and skillfully. My hypothesis that there is only one god in this system has sometimes led me to translate verbs describing deity with a masculine pronoun even when a feminine seems called for (e.g., in col. XVIII); similar problems confront translators of Gnostic texts. I have attempted to render the sense of participles (i.e., causal, conditional, or whatever), rather than leave their nuances indeterminate as the text so often does. The use of singular verbs with neuter plural subjects has led to mistranslations, and some counter-to-fact conditionals

57. “Fire Next Time,” 118.

58. See Janko, “Physicist as Hierophant,” 62–63, 85–86.

59. See, e.g., D. A. Russell, *An Anthology of Greek Prose* (Oxford, 1991), 2–4, for the style of such writers as Pherecydes, Acusilaus, and Hecataeus; L. R. Palmer, *The Greek Language* (London and Boston, 1980), 143–44, for passages that make a similar impression in the Hippocratic corpus, e.g., *Airs, Waters, and Places* 24.41–52 (or *De victu* 5–24, whose author imitates Heraclitus); and J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford, 1952), 1–4, on the styles of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras. Our author seems less practiced as a prose writer than Herodotus or Antiphon; his awkwardness may be compared with that of the “Old Oligarch.” For further thoughts on the style see Janko, “Physicist as Hierophant,” 62–63, 84–85.

have not been correctly rendered. The text is also corrupt in more places than have been recognized.

Working on the book-rolls from Herculaneum, where the papyri themselves have often perished, has made me realize how much progress can be made even on materials where the original is not accessible for study. Photographs of carbonized papyri can be misleading, but this one photographed well. Further image enhancement, new techniques for placing *sot-toposti* and *sovrapposti* (scraps of one layer of papyrus that have become stuck to another), the use of a Nikon binocular microscope with a fluorescent ring-light around the lens, and the new technique of multi-spectral digital imaging might all be of help in improving the text further.<sup>60</sup> I am doubtless in error about the placing of some *paragraphoi*, and may often be wrong about the exact status of doubtful letters; part of the uncertainty may be owed to whether, in different published transcripts, sublateral dots are employed to denote letters that are actually doubtful, or merely incomplete. I have not hesitated to offer further supplements and suggestions that will be open to refutation when the original is properly published; I am not in a position to know which of these have already been advanced by others. My intention is merely to contribute to our understanding of what the papyrus says, which has been so signally advanced by the new material.

The text, which I reconstructed from published sources to serve as a basis for my translation, and which is not reproduced here, relies entirely on published sources, including photographs studied using image enhancement.<sup>61</sup> My present sources are: (a) the anonymous text of cols. III–XXVI in *ZPE* 47 (1982), after p. 300 (here “ed.”); (b) the complete translation by A. Laks and G. W. Most, in their edited volume *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus* (Oxford, 1997), 9–22, made with the help of unpublished translations by R. Lambertson, D. Obbink, and J. Bollack, and checked against his transcript of the original by K. Tsantsanoglou (here “Ts.”); (c) the first seven columns published by K. Tsantsanoglou in the same volume, pp. 93–95 (here “Ts.”); (d) L. Brisson’s text of col. XII in Laks and Most, 151–52, checked by Tsantsanoglou; (e) D. Obbink’s text of cols. XX and XXII in Laks and Most, 42–43, 48–49, checked by Tsantsanoglou; (f) W. Burkert’s text of col. XXV in Laks and Most, 167–68, checked by Tsantsanoglou (but the text is printed without dots indicating uncertain letters); (g) the photograph of cols. XXI–XXII on the dust jacket of Laks and Most, which adds pieces at the bottom to plate 51 in E. G. Turner, *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World*, rev. and ed. P. J. Parsons (London, 1987); (h) the plates of cols. V and XXII in *BCH* 86 (1962): 794; (i) those of cols. XI–XII, XVII–XIX, XXI–XXIII, and XXVI in *AD* 19 A (1964): Plates 12–15; (j) S. G. Kapsomenos’ transcript of cols. XVII–XIX, XXI–XXIV, and XXVI in the same journal, pp. 23–25, which appears, to judge from the photographs, to be in places more accurate than (a), since it does not dot letters that are damaged

60. The Philodemus Translation Project has found these techniques invaluable for studying the carbonized papyri from Herculaneum. For the digital imaging, introduced by Dr. Steven W. Booras of the Center for the Preservation of Ancient Religious Texts at Brigham Young University, see *Cronache Ercolanesi* 29 (1999): 95–100.

61. I have neither obtained nor sought access to the original papyrus.

but not in doubt (here “Kaps.”); (k) the plates of cols. XI–XII and XVII in *BASP* 1 (1963–64): 13–14;<sup>62</sup> (l) the partial text in J. S. Rusten, “Interim Notes on the Papyrus from Derveni,” *HSCP* 89 (1985): 121–40 (here “Rusten”); (m) the text, plate, and apparatus in K. Tsantsanoglou and G. M. Parásoglou, “Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus,” in *Aristoxenica, Menandrea, Fragmenta Philosophica*, ed. A. Brancacci et al. (Florence, 1988), 125–33, revised in their “Heraclitus 1T,” *Corpus dei papiri filosofici* I.1\*\* (Florence, 1992), 221–26. For the Orphic verses I have collated the text of M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford, 1983), 114–15 (here “West”). None of these has an *apparatus criticus*. “Merkelbach” refers to proposals in R. Merkelbach, “Der orphische Papyrus von Derveni,” *ZPE* 1 (1967): 21–32. The table below gives the new column-numbers, those of the *ZPE* edition of 1982, and my sources for each column, as follows:

COLUMN-NOS. IN LAKS AND MOST:	COLUMN-NOS. IN <i>ZPE</i> :	SOURCES:
I–II	—	b, c
III–IV	B (in part), A	a, b, c, m
V	I	a, b, c, h
VI–VII	II–III (parts in B)	a, b, c
VIII–X	IV–VI	a, b, l
XI	VII	a, b, i, k, l
XII	VIII	a, d, i, k
XIII–XV	IX–XI	a, b, l
XVI	XII	a, b
XVII	XIII	a, b, k
XVIII–XIX	XIV–XV	a, b, i, j
XX	XVI	a, b, e, l
XXI	XVII	a, b, g, i, j
XXII	XVIII	a, b, e, g, h, i, j
XXIII	XIX	a, b, i, j
XXIV	XX	a, b, j
XXV	XXI	a, b, f
XXVI	XXII	a, b, i, j

In the notes, which serve as an *apparatus criticus*, when I suggest that the reading in all the published transcripts is wrong, I have underlined letters that I have altered, for example, λαμπρότα where previous editors read

62. Several of the illustrations in (h), (i), and (k) are reproduced in R. Seider, *Paläographie der griechischen Papyri*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1970), pl. 1.

λαμπρό[τ]ητα (col. XXV 1). α indicates, at least where I could refer to an image, a letter that is damaged in such a way that it could be read as another, ᾶ an insertion above the line, [[α]] a deletion by the scribe, [α] a letter lost in a lacuna, <sub>1</sub>α a letter restored from a quotation elsewhere, {α} a deletion by an editor, and ⟨α⟩ a letter added by an editor. Suggestions of my own that I have not seen in other sources are indicated with an asterisk. I have repunctuated freely. Since no text is printed, I have not been able to indicate all my changes to the punctuation, but these can be reconstructed from the English version. In the translation, round brackets mark material supplied to complete the sense or lost in a lacuna; I have not indicated supplements where there is general agreement, or the length of lacunae. A gap of undetermined length follows each column.

\* \* \*

I . . . each one . . . of Erinyes<sup>63</sup> . . . <sup>64</sup>

\* \* \*

II . . . Eriny(e)s . . . of Erinyes . . . they honor . . . are souls . . . drink-offerings in droplets . . . (when) . . . brings . . . <sup>65</sup> honors . . . (offer) to each (of them) some sort of bird . . . harmonized to the music . . .

\* \* \*

III<sup>66</sup> . . . Erinyes<sup>67</sup> . . . But (a) daimon comes into existence for each one . . . persons who are wiped out<sup>68</sup> . . . , but those below<sup>69</sup> (are called?) daimons . . . , and do not have (?) . . . of (the?) gods, but are called servants . . . they are, like wicked men who are punished with death, and they are responsible<sup>70</sup> . . . such (persons) as . . . initiate<sup>71</sup> . . .

63. In the opening columns the author reveals the nature of the Furies, which continue to be discussed in cols. II–IV and VI. They are merely daimons, which are souls of the angry dead (col. VI). Col. V, like cols. VII and XX, reveals that his argument seeks to dispel the ignorance of ordinary seekers after faith. On these cols. see S. I. Johnston, *Restless Dead: Encounters Between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999), 273–79.

64. The scrap published in 1982 as frag. A 13–15 seems now to be unplaced, and is not included in this translation.

65. A two-termination adjective describing the honors is lost.

66. *Apparatus criticus* to col. III: 1–3 fines versuum (olim frag. B 4–6) huc dubitanter collocavi (nisi ad col. IV 10 sqq. collocandae) 5 οἱ δὲ L. Battezzato per litt.: καλοῦνται] δὲ \* 6 οἱ West ap. Laks et Most p. 83: οἱ ed. κάτω[θεν Ts.: κάτω [εἰσίν ed. ο]δὲ ἔχου[σι Ts. p. 106: ο]ὐ δέχον[ται \*: το]ῦδε χοῦ per-peram Ts. 9 θα[νάτωι ζημιούμ]ενοι West ap. Ts. p. 96 11 μ]υστ[ι \*

67. I have placed here a fragment containing the ends of three lines, printed as frag. B 4–6 in the 1982 text. It could alternatively be placed in col. IV 10–12. But for all I know there may be physical evidence to contradict either placing.

68. I.e., by the effects of a curse, which “wipes out” themselves and their descendants: cf., e.g., ἐξώλει-αν ἑαυτῶι καὶ τοῖς παισίν ἐπαρώμενος (Lys. 12.10). A reference to the effects of a curse would be pertinent to Diagoras’ book, which revealed his lapse from faith after being cheated by a perjurer (see the *Suda*, as cited above, n. 24). The author soon argues that the Eumenides are in fact angry souls (col. VI); they traditionally enforced curses.

69. Ts.’s το]ῦδε χοῦ [ “this mound” is unlikely, as it would require το]ῦδε (τοῦ). The difficulty is noted by Johnston, *Restless Dead* (n. 63 above), p. 275, n. 54.

70. Or “they are accused.”

71. Or “mysteries,” or “later” (ὅστερ-).

\* \* \*

... he who changes established (penalties) ... to give, rather than causes harm ... did not let (the world) accept the vicissitudes of destiny.<sup>73</sup> Is not (the) world<sup>74</sup> ordered as a result of these? Likewise Heraclitus, deeming the shared (sensations) important, overturns those that are individual.<sup>75</sup> Speaking like an allegorist, he said:<sup>76</sup>

IV<sup>72</sup>

“the sun, in accord with its own nature, is in breadth the size of a human foot, and does not surpass its limits; for, if it surpasses its own breadth at all, (the) Erinyes, (the) allies of Justice, will discover it.”<sup>77</sup>

... surpassing<sup>78</sup> ... they sacrifice<sup>79</sup> ... of justice ... by the moon (?)<sup>80</sup> ...

\* \* \*

... and terrors (?)<sup>82</sup> ... ask an oracle ... they ask an oracle ... for them we will enter<sup>83</sup> the prophetic shrine to inquire, with regard to what is proph-

V<sup>81</sup>

72. *Apparatus* to col. IV: 3 τ]ὰ \*: ἀλλ]ὰ Bremmer per litt. π[άθη \*: γ]Ι Ts. 4 εἶ[α Ts. p. 107 (ι vel κ, η) τά[σσεται διὰ \*: τά[ξιν ἐχει ἐκ Ts. 5 με[γάλα νομίζων \*: με[τασκευάζων Ts. 6 ἰκέλ[ως vel ἰκέλ[α Ts. et Parássoglou: ἰκέλ[οῖ Ts. ἱερο]λόγοι Sider ap. Laks et Most p. 135: θεο]λόγοι Ts. et Parássoglou: μυθο]λόγοι Ts. ἔφη Ts. et Parássoglou: ὄδω Ts. 11 θύου[σι Lebedev ap. Ts. et Parássoglou.

73. τύχη must mean “destiny” rather than “random chance,” reflecting the outcome of the divine plan. Cf. Diagoras *PMG* frag. 738: κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχαν τὰ πάντα βροτοῖσιν ἐκτελεῖται.

74. κόσμος was a term favored by the sophists; those who discussed its nature were widely suspected of impiety (Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11).

75. The sequence of thought (which depends on the ambiguity of πάθη) seems to be that, just as the world is ordered by the πάθη τῆς τύχης, so our shared πάθη order our lives. As Sider showed (“Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus,” 134–35), this passage reflects Heraclitus’ doctrine of the opposition between τὰ κοινά and τὰ ἴδια. Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 7.127–34 = DK 22 A 16) explains that Heraclitus rejected τὰ ἴδια, i.e., an individual’s sensations (notably when dreaming), in favor of τὰ κοινά, i.e., phenomena that we all perceive; these alone are trustworthy (πιστά), according to the shared divine λόγος that encompasses us when we are awake and breathing. Note especially B 89: τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμημένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι (cf. the reference to κόσμος that precedes in IV); B 2; and Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.129: τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον δι’ ἀναπονής σπᾶσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα. The idea that Air is essential to intelligence goes far to explain why Heraclitus’ thought appealed to our author, since it resembles Diogenes’ equation of Air with Mind. Johnston, *Restless Dead*, 265–67, follows Laks and Most.

76. I take ἱερολόγος and ἱερολογεῖσθαι (col. VII), literally “one who tells a holy tale,” to denote “one who deliberately conveys hidden truths through a story about the gods” (see above, n. 7). Ts.’s ἰκέλ[οῖ entails a rare and late verb; ἰκέλ[α (Ts. and Parássoglou) will not do, as it is Heraclitus himself who must be compared to an allegorist, not Heraclitus’ words.

77. DK 22 B 3 + B 94. Col. XXV refers back to this discussion of the size of the sun.

78. This sense of ὑπερβατόν is unattested; contrast col. VIII 6.

79. Perhaps another reference to sacrifices to the Erinyes like those in cols. II and VI.

80. Or, perhaps, μηνιτά, “things which occasion divine wrath”? This form is unattested, however.

81. *Apparatus* to col. V: 1 καὶ δεῖν[α \* 5 θέμι[ς ἀπ]ιτεῖν [τὰ \* 7 πραγμάτων Ts.: παραδειγμάτων coni. A. H. Griffiths per litteras 10 τὸ αὐτό \*: ταῦτόν Ts. 11 γινώ[σ]κωσι \*: γινώ[σ]κωσι Ts. 12 ἐνόπνια \*

82. The author reverts (as he will again at col. XX) to attacking the ignorance of conventional believers. Such folk faithfully visit oracles, yet disbelieve experiences like dreams of the terrors of Hades. They disbelieve because they do not understand them rightly, i.e., as allegories. The connection between understanding and belief is crucial for this writer; he thinks that taking such things literally is an obstacle to faith. Dreams are the most important type of Heraclitus’ ἴδια (see on col. IV), things that only individuals perceive and that are therefore unreliable (ἄπιστα); cf. Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.131 = DK 22 A 16: τὸ μὲν κοινή πᾶσι φαινόμενον, τοῦτ’ εἶναι πιστόν (τῶ κοινῶ γὰρ καὶ θεῖῳ λόγῳ λαμβάνεται), τὸ δὲ τινι μόνῳ προσπίπτον ἄπιστον ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αἰτίαν. Without interpretation, such things are unbelievable; if, as the author sarcastically remarks, he got an oracle to vouch for their truth, this would still not make them believable. For a scandalous question put to an oracle compare Chaeophon’s question to Delphic Apollo about Socrates (Pl. *Ap.* 21a; Xen. *Ap.* 14). Socrates saw the oracular response as a riddle in need of interpretation (αἰνίττεται, Pl. *Ap.* 21b).

83. πάριεν must have a future meaning.

esied,<sup>84</sup> whether it is permissible to disbelieve in the terrors of Hades.<sup>85</sup> Why do they disbelieve (in them)? Since they do not understand dream-visions or any of the other occurrences,<sup>86</sup> what sort of proofs would induce them to believe? For, since they are overcome by both error and pleasure as well,<sup>87</sup> they do not learn or believe. Disbelief and ignorance are the same thing. For if they do not learn or comprehend, it is impossible for them to believe even when they see dream-visions . . . disbelief . . . appears . . .

\* \* \*

VI<sup>88</sup> . . . prayers and sacrifices placate souls. An incantation by *magoi* can dislodge daemons that become a hindrance; daemons that are<sup>89</sup> a hindrance are vengeful<sup>90</sup> souls. For this reason the *magoi* perform the sacrifice, as if<sup>91</sup> they are paying a blood-price. Onto the<sup>92</sup> offerings they make libations of water and milk, with both of which they also make the drink-offerings. They sacrifice cakes that are countless and many-humped,<sup>93</sup> because the souls too are countless.<sup>94</sup> Initiates make a first sacrifice to (the) Eumenides in the same way as *magoi* do; for (the) Eumenides are souls. Hence a person who

84. Not "on behalf of those seeking oracular answers," since ἔνεκεν does not mean ὑπέρ, and αὐτοῖς would be redundant.

85. Perhaps the author depends here and in col. VI on Protagoras' book Περί τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου (Diog. Laert. 9.55), which, I suspect, is the ultimate origin of the opposing arguments at Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.66 ("since everyone believes in the terrors of Hades, which are obviously false, we cannot accept that gods exist simply because everyone believes in them") and 9.74 ("if souls persist, they are the same as daemons, but if daemons exist, then gods too exist, since their existence is in no way hindered by the preconception of what is said to go on in Hades"). The argument is perhaps that images of Hades in dreams do not reflect reality, as in Heraclitus' distinction between dreaming and waking sensations cited in col. IV. Note that Socrates accepted the importance of dreams but held that they need interpretation (Pl. *Phd.* 60d–61b), yet ignored unpleasant notions of Hades (Pl. *Ap.* 40c–41d).

86. παραγμάτων must mean "occurrences" (LSJ s.v. II), not "physical realities." A. H. Griffiths' appealing conjecture παραδειγμάτων "proofs," the early sense of παράδειγμα (e.g., Thuc. 1.2.6), entails repeating the same word in the next clause, a common early idiom.

87. Their "pleasure" is their wish, as sinners, not to believe so disagreeable a doctrine as the punishment of the sinful soul after death. I follow Laks and Most's translation of τῆς ἄλλης ἡδονῆς; for the idiom cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 382–83 and Pl. *Grg.* 473c τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕξων, with LSJ<sup>9</sup>, s.v. ἄλλος II.8. Alan Griffiths (*per litteras*) well compares Pl. *Prt.* 321e, (Prometheus) κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπροον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, translated by Guthrie as "carrying off Hephaestus' art of working with fire, and the art of Athena as well."

88. *Apparatus* to col. VI: 3 ἐμπο[δῶν ὄντες εἰσὶ \*; ἐμπο[δῶν εἰσὶ Ts. 4 ψ[υχαὶ τιμω]ροὶ Ts. p. 113: ψ[υχαι εἰσθ]ροὶ Ts. θουσ[ιη]ν \*; θουσ[ια]ν ed. 5 τοῖζε \* (i.e., τοῖς δὲ); τοῖδε ed.: τοῖ(ς) δὲ Ts. 12 ὥ[στ]ε \* 13 ψυχ[αῖ] \* 14 ἀλλ[ᾶ] \*

89. It is grammatically indispensable to supply ὄντες.

90. I accept ψ[υχαι τιμω]ροὶ, suggested by Ts. in Laks and Most, 113, but also thought of ἀνο[λο]βοι. Ts. prints ψ[υχαι εἰσθ]ροὶ, which is accepted by Johnston, *Restless Dead*, 275, but the point is that the daemons are souls who are owed a penalty, as the sequel shows. For discussion of this column see A. Henrichs, "Dromena and Legomena," in *Ansichten griechischer Rituale. Geburtstag-Symposium für Walter Burkert*, ed. F. Graf (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1998), 33–71, at 33–35; W. Burkert, *Da Omero ai magi*, 105–7.

91. Or "as," "since"; ὥσπερ may mean either, and certainly means "as" in col. IX 2 (where see n. 112).

92. The omission of the sigma in τοῖς is explicable if the MS, or its ancestor, had τοῖζε, with ζ for *sd* as in Ἀθηνᾶζε.

93. Clement of Alexandria says that πόπανα πολυόμφαλα were in mystic chests (*Protr.* 2.2, 19 P.); these were used in the rites of the Cabiri and Eleusinian Demeter (*Protr.* 16 P., 18 P.).

94. For this view of the world as full of souls cf. Thales (DK 11 A 22–23) and the Pythagorean *Memories* excerpted by Alexander Polyhistor (apud Diog. Laert. 8.31–32); although these date from the third century B.C.E. (W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* [Cambridge, Mass., 1972], 53, 57–59), Aristotle (*De an.* 1.2.404a1–16) reports that the Pythagoreans (DK 58 B 40) and Democritus (DK 67 A 28) regarded the motes in a sunbeam as souls (W. Burkert, *Da Omero ai magi*, 108).

intends to sacrifice to (the) gods first (sacrifices) a bird . . . , so that even the . . . , but they are souls . . . this, but as many (souls) as . . . of . . . , but they wear . . .

\* \* \*

(I shall also prove that Orpheus composed a)<sup>95</sup> hymn that says wholesome and permissible things. For he was speaking allegorically<sup>97</sup> with his composition, and it was<sup>98</sup> impossible (for him) to state the application<sup>99</sup> of his words and what was meant. His composition is a strange one, riddling for human beings. But Orpheus did not wish to state with it unbelievable<sup>100</sup> riddles, but important things in riddles. In fact he is speaking allegorically from his very first word right through to his<sup>101</sup> last, as he reveals even in his well-known<sup>102</sup> verse: for when he tells them to “shut the doors” on their ears, he means that he is not making laws for most people, (but that he is addressing only)<sup>103</sup> those who are pure in hearing . . .

VII<sup>96</sup>

But in the next verse . . .

\* \* \*

. . . , as has been revealed in the following verse:

VIII<sup>104</sup>

“those who were born of Zeus the almighty king.”

That (the world) is ruled<sup>105</sup> (Orpheus) reveals in the following verses:

“When Zeus took from his father the predicted rule and strength in his arms and the illustrious daimon.”

95. My restoration of the missing sense.

96. *Apparatus* to col. VII: 2 ἱερολογεῖ]το \*: ἱερούργει]το Ts. 3 τ' [ἦν \*: τ[ε Ts. 4 θέ]σιγ \*: λύ]σιγ Ts.: φύ]σιγ Laks et Most καί τ[ᾶ \*: καί]τοι Ts. 6 ἄ]πιστ' \*: ἐ]ρίστ' Ts.: ἄ]ριστ' Ts. p. 121: ὕβ]ριστ' vel ἀχ]ρηστ' vel ἀγάρ]ριστ' fort. temptanda: ἀό]ριστ' F. Ferrari per litteras ἔθελε \*: ἦθελε Ts.: ΕΘΕΑΣ ed. 8 (τ)οῦ Ts. p. 123: οὔ Ts. 9 εὐθ]ρυλήτωι \*: εὐκ]ρινήτωι Ts. 11 ἀλλὰ μόνον πρὸς \* τοὺς ante τῆ]ν suppl. Ts. p. 127.

97. I read ἱερολογεῖ]το because Orpheus' actions are not in question; the poet deliberately presented an allegory throughout his poem. ἠνί]ζε]το would convey the same sense, but is too short.

98. ἦν is essential because the author, confident that he can interpret the poem, would not say that it is inexplicable. It was Orpheus who did not wish to render the sense transparent, as the treatise goes on to argue; “for him” is my explanatory parenthesis to make this clear.

99. The desired meaning is “the sense of the words.” This is given exactly by ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις (Pl. *Cra.* 390d), where νομοθέτης is derived from ὀνόματα θήσεσθαι.

100. I supply ἄ]πιστα because the author reverts to the topic of belief (as in col. V), to which a literal reading of Orpheus' hymn, with its deeds of violence between gods, is a serious obstacle. Orpheus offers “important” truths, like those shared perceptions valued as “important” by Heraclitus in col. IV.

101. The error in (τ)οῦ arose because of the idiom μέγχι οὔ.

102. The famous verse that ended θύρας δ' ἐπίεσθε βέβηλοι (*Orph. frag.* [OF] 13/247 or 334 Kern) began Orpheus' poem: it was perhaps already well known even among noninitiates. My conjecture εὐθ]ρυλη-τωι posits that ΥΛ has been misread as ΙΝ (easy enough in this hand); this word is found only in Vettius Valens, but πολυθρύλητος is attested from Plato onwards (*Phdr.* 100b). Ts.'s supplement εὐκ]ρινήτωι is attested only as a probable *falsa lectio* in Aretaeus (LSJ s.v.); ἀδιευκρίνητος is used to describe “undifferentiated” matter by the first-century writer Heraclitus (*Homeric Allegories* 48).

103. My supplement for the sense.

104. *Apparatus* to col. VIII: 1 ὥς \* 7 ἔσ]τιν Ts. p. 12 9–10 τῆ]ν δυνασ]τεῖ|[αν πατρὸς] \*: ἐπικρα]τεῖ | [τοῦ πατρὸς] Ts. λαμβ[άνειν \*: λαμβ[άνει Ts. ἀπ' \*: παρ' Ts. αὐτο]ῦ \* 12 καὶ Ts. u.v.

105. ἄρχεται means “is ruled,” not “he begins,” *pace* Rusten, 126.

It has not been noticed that these verses are in an altered order. They (in fact) run as follows: “When Zeus took strength from his father and the illustrious daimon.” Since they run this way, one must understand<sup>106</sup> them not (as) “Zeus takes his father’s power,” but (as) “he (takes) strength<sup>107</sup> from him,” having it<sup>108</sup> “contrary to predictions”<sup>109</sup> . . . For to this . . . necessity being considered . . . and having learned . . .

\* \* \*

IX<sup>110</sup> to be. So (Orpheus) made the rule belong to<sup>111</sup> the strongest, as<sup>112</sup> a son (belongs) to its father. But those who do not comprehend what is meant suppose that Zeus takes the strength and the daimon from his own father. So, understanding that, when fire has been mingled with the other (elements), it agitates the things that exist and stops them from coming together because of heat, (Zeus) alters (it) so that it is unable, once altered, to stop the things that exist from coalescing. Those (elements) that are ignited are dominated, and once they are dominated<sup>113</sup> they mingle with the other (elements). But (we understand) that (Orpheus) put a riddle in the words “he took in his arms,” just as the other (elements) . . . the firmest (elements) are intended . . . strongly, he stated that Zeus strongly (seized) . . . the daimon, as if . . . (belong to) a strong one . . .

\* \* \*

(The next verse is:)

“Night, the gods’ immortal nurse, who voices all things, said.”

(“Voicing all things” means “teaching all things.” For “voice” and “utterance” are the same thing, to “voice” means the same as to “utter,” and to “utter” means the same)<sup>114</sup>

X<sup>115</sup> as to “say.” For it is impossible to “say” if one does not “utter,” and (Orpheus) deemed “say” and “utter” the same thing. “Say” and “teach” have the same sense; for it is impossible to “teach” without saying whatever is

106. For this sense of ἀκούειν see LSJ, s.v. IV.

107. I do not accept Ts.’s speculative reconstruction, especially ἐπικρα]τεῖ in the sense “the predominant meaning is.”

108. Probably not “as (the words) run thus” (ὡδ’ ἔ]χοντα) or “being in another order” (ἄλλως ἔ]χοντα), as Ts. suggests.

109. A gloss on the verse above, “the predicted rule.”

110. *Apparatus* to col. IX: 1 εἶ]ναί Ts. τῆ[ν ἀρ]χὴν Ts. 5 πῦρ [σμμ]μ- Ts. 7 suppl. Rusten 9 ἐπικ]ρατηθέν(τα) \*: ἐπικ]ρατηθῆν ed. 11 τ]ᾶ in fine versus \* 12 νοεῖ[ται \* 13 ἰσχυρῶς Ts.: -ρὸς ed. 14 τ]ὸν \*

111. Not “come from,” *pace* Laks and Most, but a possessive genitive.

112. ὡσπερὶ followed by a noun means “as” here (LSJ, s.v.; cf. Soph. *OT* 264; Ar. *Vesp.* 129), as perhaps at col. VI 5, rather than “as if.”

113. My correction ἐπικ]ρατηθέν(τα) yields the construction, common in Herodotus, where a finite verb that ends a clause is picked up by a participle formed from the same verb. The mistake is easy, because the neuter plural subject governs a singular verb.

114. All this is my supplement for the sense.

115. *Apparatus* to col. X: ante 1 τὸ δ’ ἐχόμενον \* εἶπε West: ἦστο *OF* 106 ]πανομφεύουσα, [θεῶν] ἱτρόφος, [ἀμβροσίη] ]Νύξ, suppl. West e *OF* 106 “πανομφεύειν” καὶ “πάντα διδάσκειν” τὸ αὐτό: “ὄμφη” γάρ καὶ “φωνή” ταῦτό δύναται, “φωνεῖν” δὲ τὸ αὐτό δύναται, e.g., \* 2 ἐνομίξε δὲ ed.: ἐνομίξετο praetulit Rusten 7 ἐχ]ωρί]σθη Rusten

taught by means of words, and “teaching” is deemed to be a kind of “saying.” So “teach” was not distinguished<sup>116</sup> from “say,” and “say” (was not distinguished) from “utter,” but “utter,” “say,” and “teach” have the same sense. Thus there is nothing to stop “voicing all things” from meaning the same as “teaching all things.”

When Orpheus terms (Night)<sup>117</sup> “nurse” he is hinting that, whatever (elements) the sun warms and dissolves, night cools and solidifies them . . . whatever (elements) the sun warmed . . .

\* \* \*

of Night. (Orpheus) says that (Night) “prophesied from the *adyton*” because he makes the judgment that the depth of night is “*adyton*”: for it does not set (*dynēi*) like the light, but the daylight overtakes it as it stays at the same point. “Prophesy” means the same as “suffice.” One must reflect that “prophesy” is used under the same conditions as “suffice,” (for example):

“As they consider that this god prophesies, they go to ascertain what they should do.”<sup>119</sup>

In the next verse (Orpheus) says:

“She prophesied all that it was permitted him to hear.”

In these words (Orpheus) revealed that . . . beside<sup>120</sup> the things that exist . . . able to . . .

\* \* \*

and to take (his rule) away.

The next verse runs as follows:

“So that on snowy Olympus’ lovely seat he rules.”

“Olympus” is the same thing as “time.” But those who suppose that “Olympus” is the same thing as “sky” are quite mistaken, as they do not comprehend that it is impossible for “sky” to be “longer” (rather) than “broader.” But if someone termed time “long,” he would not be at all mistaken. Wherever (Orpheus) intended to say “sky,” he added the epithet<sup>122</sup> “broad,” but wherever (he meant) “time” (he did) the opposite, since he never (added the epithet) “broad,” but “long.” By saying that (Olympus) is “snowy,” he used the

XI<sup>118</sup>

XII<sup>121</sup>

116. I accept ἐχ[ωρί]σθη hesitantly, since it is attested with ἀπό but not with ἐκ.

117. The rest of this col. follows Ts. The author puns on the two senses of τρέφω, “nurture” and “thicken, curdle.”

118. *Apparatus* to col. XI: 8–9 frag. Heracliti aliunde ignotum agnovi 9 ἐν ἐχ[ωρί]μέν[ω]ι \* 10 ἦ οἱ West ἦεν West ἀκού]σαι \*: ἀνύσ]σαι West 11 ἐν τούτ]οις \*

119. This sentence, marked with paragraphi as a quotation, was recognized as such by Rusten, “Interim Notes,” 132; I think it is a new fragment of Heraclitus. The claim that “prophesy” (χρησαι) means the same as “suffice” (ἀρκέσαι) is typically implausible.

120. Or “despite.”

121. *Apparatus* to col. XII: ante 1 τὴν ἀρχὴν \* 1 ἀφα[ίρει]ν \* 2 ἀρχ[η]ι \*: ἄρξαι West p. 86 9 χρόνον \*: \*Ὀλυμπον ed. 11 ἐ[χρή]σατο \* 12–14 Ts.

122. For this sense of προσθήκη, missing from the lexica, see Strabo 1.2.3 and Philodemus *De poem.* I col. 24,20 (see R. Janko, ed. and trans., *Philodemus: “On Poems,” Book I* [Oxford, 2000], p. 213, n. 6).

meaning . . . snow-covered . . . snow-covered . . . white . . . bright . . . grey . . .  
and . . .

\* \* \*

(the verse:)

XIII<sup>123</sup> “When Zeus had heard his father’s prophecies.”

For neither did he hear them then, but it has been revealed that he had (already) heard them, nor does Night order (him), but (Orpheus) reveals (this) by saying as follows:

“He ingested the penis<sup>124</sup> that first procreated<sup>125</sup> the ether.”

Since (Orpheus) is speaking about reality in a riddling way throughout his composition, one must discuss (it) verse by verse. He used this verse, likening the sun to a genital organ, because he saw that people think that procreation resides in the genital organs, and does not arise without the genital organs. For without the sun it is impossible for the things that exist to have come to be as they are, and when the things that exist had come about . . . the sun everything . . . nor for the things that exist . . . to surround . . .

\* \* \*

(the sun)

XIV<sup>126</sup> “procreated” the brightest and whitest (element),<sup>127</sup> once it had been separated from itself. So (Orpheus) states that this “Kronos” was born to Earth by the sun, because he caused (the elements) to be “thrust” (*krouesthai*) against each other on account of the sun. This is why (Orpheus) says “he who did a great deed.”

The next verse:

“Sky son of Night, he who first was king.”

123. *Apparatus* to col. XIII: 2 τότε non τότε supplendum 11 γγγ[έσθαι Ts. καὶ γενομ]ένων \*

124. West holds that the commentator misinterprets αἰδοῖον “reverend one,” an epithet, as “penis” (*Orphic Poems*, 85–86); the same pun appears in Heraclitus (DK 22 F 15). However, Burkert, *Da Omero ai magi*, 81–83, has proved that this is wrong, and the poem did entail this obscene episode. First, it parallels the Hittite tale of Kumarbi, who bites off the penis of the Sky-god Anu, and thus becomes pregnant with the Storm-god and two River-gods (cf. Zeus at col. XVI 3–6). Secondly, Burkert adduces a neglected passage where Diogenes Laertius (1.5) denies that Orpheus was a philosopher, since he attributes shameful acts to the gods, including oral sex: ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ τὸν περὶ θεῶν ἐξαγορεύσαντα τοιαῦτα χρῆ φιλόσοφον καλεῖν οὐκ οἶδα, (οὐδὲ) τίνα δεῖ προσαγορεύειν τὸν πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον πάθος ἀφειδοῦντα τοῖς θεοῖς προστρίψαι, καὶ τὰ σπανίως ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰσχροῦργούμενα τῷ τῆς φωνῆς ὄργάνῳ.

125. For this interpretation of ἐκθρόσκω with an object in the accusative (“ejaculate, procreate”) I follow Burkert (*Da Omero ai magi*, 82), who compares Aesch. frag. 15 Radt, θρόσκων κνώδαλα, which Hesychius (s.v.) glosses ἐκθορίζων καὶ σπερματίζων; cf. θρόός “semen” and Aesch. *Eum.* 660. Lamberton had suggested (in Laks and Most) that, although the papyrus has αἰθέρα ἔκθορε, the Orphic *logos* originally read αἰθέρος ἔκθορε, “sprang from the ether”; but cf. Rusten, “Interim Notes,” p. 125, n. 9.

126. *Apparatus* to col. XIV: 1 τὸ[ν] Rusten: τὸν ed. 10 ἔ[ρ]ου Ts. 11 τῶν ἐ[όντων] et ἀπάντ[ω]ν Ts. 12 ὄρ[αῖ] τῆ]ν \* 13–14 ἀφαρ[εῖ]σθαι δ’ αὐ[τόμ] φησι τῆμ βασιλ[εῖ]ταν | [κρουο]μένων τ[ῶν] ἐ[ό]ντων fere Ts.

127. I.e., the ether. The neuter τὸ[ν] λαμπρότατον agrees with χωρισθὲν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ. If we kept τὸν, “sun” would have preceded, which makes the syntax impossible. For ἐκθρόσκω “ejaculate, procreate,” see n. 125 above.

After he has named Mind (*Nous*) “Kronos” because he thrust (*krouonta*) (the elements) against one another, (Orpheus) states that he “did a great deed” to Sky: for he states that (Sky) had his kingship taken away. (Orpheus) named him “Kronos” after his action, and (named) the other (elements) in accord with the same principle. For of all the things that exist . . . as he sees the nature . . . (Orpheus) states that (Sky) had his kingship taken away (when) the things that exist (were thrust together).<sup>128</sup> . . .

\* \* \*

(. . . when Mind caused)<sup>129</sup>  
 them<sup>131</sup> to thrust<sup>132</sup> against each other, and made the things that exist, once they had been separated, stand apart from each other. For as the sun was being separated and cut off in the middle, (Mind) fixed both the (elements) above the sun and those below, and holds them fast. XV<sup>130</sup>

Next verse:

“From him in turn (came) Kronos, and next was crafty Zeus.”

(Orpheus) means that his rule has existed since he became king. But his rule is explained<sup>133</sup> because, by thrusting the things that exist against each other, he caused them to stand apart and created the present transmutation, not (creating) different things from different ones, but different ones from the same.

The phrase “and next was crafty Zeus” reveals that he is not a different (god), but the same one.

(Orpheus) states the following:

“Seizing kingly honor, he swallowed Metis too.”<sup>134</sup>

\* \* \*

It has been revealed that (Orpheus) stated that the sun is a genital organ. He says that the things which now are arise from existent things: XVI<sup>135</sup>

“of the penis of the first-born king, and on him grew  
 all the immortals, blessed gods and goddesses,

128. Laks and Most (p. 16, n. 34) report further proposals of Ts. after this, the cogency of which cannot be judged.

129. My suggestion for the sense; the aorist subjunctive shows that ὅταν preceded, and the verbs need not refer to the present.

130. *Apparatus* to col. XV: 1 κρ[ο]ύε(ι)ν Rusten πρῶτ]ον Ts.: λοιπ]ὸν Burkert ap. Rusten 7 τοῦδ' ἧ \*; τοῦδε ed. ἧ δὲ Burkert: ἧδε ed. 8 ὄ[τι τὰ Rusten 9 ἐπ[ό]ησε \*: ἐξ[ει] εις Rusten 10 ἔτε[ρ] ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν \*: ἐτέ[ρω]ς τὰ αὐτὰ Burkert 12 δηλοῖ \*: δηλον Ts. λέγειμι \*: δηλοῖ]ι Ts. καί West κατέπινεν ἐλ]θῶμ \*: μακάρωγ κατέχ]ωμ West

131. I.e., the elements.

132. κρουν is a mistake for κρούε(ι)ν, not just “equivalent” to it (Ts.).

133. I take διηγείται as passive with Merkelbach, Burkert, Rusten, and Ts. rather than middle with Laks and Most.

134. Zeus was called μητέρα in the previous verse (col. XV 6) to make a pun with Μητις (such a pun is implicit at *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 322, 345).

135. *Apparatus* to col. XVI: ante 1 και ὅτι μὲν] \* 3 τῶι δ' West: τοῦ δ' ed. 10 post αὐ]τῶν supplevi (τὸν) per haplographiam omissum 12 ὑπάρχ]οντα \* 14 νῦν δ' ἐστ]ι βασιλευ[ς] πάντ[ων] και τ' ἔσσειτ' ἐπι]ετα West post 15 “Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀργικέραυτος” suppl. West e *OF* 21a.1

the rivers, lovely springs and all the rest,  
all that had then been born; he himself alone became.”

In these words he hints<sup>136</sup> that the things which exist have always existed, and those which now are arise from existent things.

The phrase: “he himself alone became.” By saying this he reveals that Mind itself,<sup>137</sup> existing on its own, is equal to everything else, as if the rest were nothing. For it is impossible for these things that exist to exist without Mind. . . . (Mind) equal to everything . . . “king of all”<sup>138</sup>. . . Mind and . . .

\* \* \*

(The next verse):

“Zeus was born first, Zeus of the shining bolt was last.”<sup>139</sup>

(This verse proves that Zeus)

XVII<sup>140</sup> existed before he was named; then he was named. For Air was pre-existent<sup>141</sup> even before those things which now exist were put together, and he<sup>142</sup> will always exist; for he did not come to be, but existed. Why (Zeus) was called “Air” has been revealed earlier (in this treatise). But he was believed to have come to be because he was named “Zeus,” as if he had not existed before. (Orpheus) said that (Air) would be “last” because he was named “Zeus,” and this will continue to be his name so long as<sup>143</sup> the things which now exist have been put together in the same element in which they were suspended when they were pre-existent. (Orpheus) is stating that the things which exist became such as they are on account of (Air), and, having come to be, are all in (Air). He (only) gives hints in these verses:

“Zeus is head, Zeus is center, all things are from Zeus.”<sup>144</sup>

(By saying) “head” he says in a riddling way that those things which exist (have Air as their) “head”<sup>145</sup> . . . his rule comes about . . . to have been put together . . .

136. For this sense of σημαίνει cf. Heraclitus' description of the lord whose oracle is at Delphi: οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλά σημαίνει (DK 22 B 93).

137. The article must have been lost here by a haplography.

138. West (*Orphic Poems*, 114) supplies a complete verse “now he is king of all, and will be in future.” For Ts.'s suggestions about the sequel see Laks and Most, p. 17, n. 40.

139. Supplied by West from *OF* 21a.1.

140. *Apparatus* to col. XVII: ante 1 ὁ Ζεὺς] \* 2' [ἐ]ῶν' \* 7 διατελεῖ ed.: διετελεῖ Laks et Most 9 δ' ἐόντα \*: δὲ ὄντα ed. φησὶ \* in fine versus: δηλοῖ Ts. 10 εἶναι \* in fine versus: μένειν Ts. u.v. 11 πάντα \*: πάλιν Ts. u.v. 13 τὰ ἐό]ντ' Ts.

141. The word written above line 2 and ending in ]ων was, I suggest, [ἐ]ῶν, which could easily have been omitted after πρόσθεν and restored when the copying was verified; cf. πρόσθεν ἐόντα in line 9.

142. “He” is Air, who is also Mind and Zeus. The translator's dilemma in choosing between “he” and “it” well illustrates how the writer's account of the universe is at once theist and materialist.

143. μέχρη must mean “so long as.” Understanding it as “until,” Laks and Most translate “this continued to be its name until the things that are now were set together into the same form in which they were floating as they were before.” This requires that διατελεῖ be emended to a preterite. I take it as future, a form well known in both Attic and Ionic. Since Air is the place in which everything exists, εἶδος needs to be taken as “element” and εἰς as a lative expression for the place where the elements coalesced, i.e., in the Air, where they had floated before they coalesced.

144. *OF* 21a.2 Kern.

145. This sentence follows Ts., whose suggestion for the last line (Laks and Most, p. 17, n. 45) I cannot accept.

\* \* \*

(the verse)

“ . . . Fate . . . ”<sup>146</sup>

(In saying this Orpheus meant not that . . . and the (elements) that are borne downwards, which he meant in stating this, but that the earth and all the other (elements) are in the Air, as he is breath. So Orpheus named this breath “Fate.”<sup>148</sup> But the rest of mankind say “Fate spun” for them, as the saying goes, and “what Fate spun will be,” speaking rightly but not knowing what either “Fate” or “spin” (*epiklosai*) is. For Orpheus called Wisdom “Fate”; for this appeared to him to be the most apt of the names that all mankind has given him. For before being called “Zeus,” Fate was (the) wisdom of God forever and always. But because (Fate) was called “Zeus,” they suppose that he came to be, although he had existed even before, but was not yet named. (This is why Orpheus says) “Zeus first (was born),” being first . . . then . . . those people who do not grasp what is meant (suppose that) . . . Zeus . . .

XVIII<sup>147</sup>

\* \* \*

(Since)

each individual thing<sup>150</sup> has been called after the dominant (element) in it, all things were called “Zeus” by the same principle; for Air dominates all things to the extent that he wants. When (people) say Fate “spun” (*epiklosai*), they mean that the Wisdom of Zeus “sanctioned” (*epikurosai*)<sup>151</sup> that what exists, has come to be, and will come to be, must have come to be, exist, and cease to be.<sup>152</sup> (Orpheus) likens him to a king—for this, among the names that were current, appeared to him to be apt—, when he says as follows:

XIX<sup>149</sup>

“Zeus the king, Zeus ruler of all, he of the shining bolt.”

(Orpheus) said that he is king because, although there are many ruler-ships,<sup>153</sup> one rule dominates and brings everything about . . . for not one . . . to bring about . . . “ruler” . . . (the world) is ruled . . .

146. A verse in which Fate (Moira) appeared must have been quoted here.

147. *Apparatus* to col. XVIII: 1 φερόμενα suppl. Ts. u.v. ἄ φάμενος [εἶπε]γ \* (antea nihil deesse crediderim) δ[ε γῆν \* 12 ο[ῦ \* : ο[υπῶ Ts. 13 γένετο in initio versus Ts. πρῶ]τόγ Ts. γ' ἐόντα \*: γὰρ Ts. u.v.

148. Contrast this interpretation of Moira with that of Epigenes, the fourth-century author of a work entitled Περὶ τῆς εἰς Ὀρφεία ποιήσεως, which ascribed other works of Orpheus to Cercops the Pythagorean and Brontinus (*OF* T 222); he interpreted Moirai as “parts of the moon” (*OF* 33).

149. *Apparatus* to col. XIX: 3 πάντων Ts.: πάντας ed. 6 γενόμενα coni. Burkert (“Orpheus” [n. 9], p. 93): γινόμενα ed. 11 ἐόντων ἀρ]χῶμ Ts.

150. Ts. suggests “Since the things that are, individually. . . .”

151. The author puns untranslatably on ἐπικλῶσαι and ἐπικυρῶσαι.

152. This translates Burkert’s essential emendation. Without it, the text would say “what exists, comes to be and will come to be must come to be, exist, and cease to be.”

153. For Ts.’s translation of the rest of the col., which I do not follow, see Laks and Most, p. 18, n. 52.

\* \* \*

(As for the initiates),<sup>154</sup>

XX<sup>155</sup> I am less amazed that (those)<sup>156</sup> persons who have performed the rites and been initiated in the cities do not comprehend them; for it is impossible to hear what is said and to learn it simultaneously. But those who (have been initiated) by someone who makes a profession of the rites<sup>157</sup> are worthy of amazement and pity: amazement because, although they suppose, before they perform the rite, that they will have knowledge, after they have performed it they go away without gaining knowledge, and make no further inquiries, as if they knew something about what they saw, heard, or learned; and pity because it does not suffice them that they have wasted the fee that they paid beforehand, but they also go away bereft of their judgment too.<sup>158</sup> Before performing the rites, they expect<sup>159</sup> to have knowledge; after they have performed them, they go away bereft even of their expectation.

To one who hears the verses (?), the story appears (to say) that Zeus (had intercourse) with his own daughter<sup>160</sup> (?) . . . [[. . . , with his mother<sup>161</sup> . . . , but with (his) sister . . . , when he saw]]<sup>162</sup> . . .

\* \* \*

(the verses)

(“when Zeus first mounted heavenly Aphrodite and begat from her Persuasion and Harmony . . .”)<sup>163</sup>

(. . . when neither the hot had come together with the hot)

XXI<sup>164</sup> nor the cold with the cold. By saying “(when Zeus) mounted”<sup>165</sup> (Orpheus)

154. The author returns to his attack on the lack of understanding among those who undergo religious instruction, as in cols. V and VII; their error is to take sacred stories literally.

155. *Apparatus* to col. XX: ante 1 ὅσοι μὲν fere Rusten τῶν \* 7 ἐπανε(ι)ρόμενοι Rusten 11 ἐλπίζουσιν \*: ἐλπίζον[τε]ς ed. 13 τῶ[ι δὲ τὰ ἔπη ἀκ]ούοντ[ι ὁ] λόγος φα[ίνε]ται τῶ[ν Ζ]ᾶνα \* 14 λ[έγειν τῆι θυγατ]ρὶ \* μ]ητρὶ ed.: num Δῆ]μητρι? τῆι δ' ἀδελφῆ[ι \*

156. I supply ὅσοι μὲν τῶν (cf. Obbink in Laks and Most, 42–43; Rusten, “Notes,” p. 139, n. 42).

157. For this contrast between public rites, e.g., at Eleusis, and private initiation, notably that into the mysteries of Dionysus offered by Orphic priests, cf. Plato (*Resp.* 2.364e), who mentions the *Orpheotelestai*.

158. Rusten (“Notes,” 138–40) deems the whole column to this point a quotation, and the following sentence a feeble paraphrase of the last point, marked by a paragraphus. But this is not convincing (cf. Obbink in Laks and Most, 43–46).

159. I emend to ἐλπίζουσιν; the paradosis ἐλπίζοντες, defended by Rusten (“Notes,” p. 139, n. 41), would be an easy mistake in a context with so many participles.

160. For the missing feminine noun I suggest “daughter.” The author turns his attention to the scandal that, in Orpheus’ poem, which was used for initiations into the Orphic mysteries of Dionysus, the poet makes Zeus commit polygamy and incest. For Zeus rapes his own mother Rhea (who bears Demeter), and then his sister-daughter Demeter (with Persephone as the result), and then perhaps his daughter Persephone (to beget Dionysus). Zeus’ rape of his mother was narrated later in the poem, as col. XXVI shows; the birth of Demeter, the fruit of this union, evidently followed, according to a forward-reference at col. XXII 12–14, a passage that may also indicate that her subsequent rape was described in it.

161. Or “Demeter”? The placing of μὲν would permit one to supply Δήμητρι.

162. The words within double brackets are apparently deleted in the papyrus.

163. To explain the next col., West invents three verses: “Zeus first created golden heavenly Aphrodite; with her were born Harmony and Persuasion.”

164. *Apparatus* to col. XXI: ante 1 οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν συνεστάθη τῷ θερμῷ \* 1 θορν(ύ)ηι \*: θόρνηι vel θόρ(υ)ηι Ts.: θορνῆι West pp. 91–92 11 ἀλλήλ[οι]ς \*: ἀλλήλο[ι]σιν ed. αὐτό \*: αὐτόν ed. 15 κ[ρατεῖ \* ὅστε Ts.

165. I.e., has sexual intercourse, like a male animal. θορν(ύ)ηι entails an unattested active of θόρνομαι, which appears soon after; the fact that it scans as a cretic can be explained if -ηι was shortened by epic

reveals that (the elements), divided into little bits, moved and “mounted” in the Air, and by “mounting” were put together with each other. They kept “mounting” until the point when each had come to its like. “Heavenly Aphrodite,” “Zeus,” “aphrodize,” “mount,” “Persuasion,” and “Harmony” are conventional names for the same God. A man uniting sexually with a woman is said to “aphrodize,” as the saying goes. For when the things that now exist were united with each other, (God) was named “Aphrodite.” (He was named) “Persuasion” because the things that exist “gave way” to each other; “to give way” is the same thing as “to persuade.” (He was named) “Harmony” because he fitted together (*hermose*) many (elements) to each of the things that exist; for they had existed even before, but were named as “coming to be” after they had been separated. The fact of their separation reveals that . . . governs, so that . . . now . . .

\* \* \*

So (Orpheus) named everything likewise as best he was able, since he understood that people do not all have a similar nature and do not all desire the same things: when they have the most power they say whatever comes into their minds—whatever they may happen to desire, not at all the same things—driven by greed, but on occasion by ignorance as well. “Earth,” “Mother,” “Rhea,” and “Hera” are the same.<sup>167</sup> She was called “Earth” by convention, “Mother” because everything comes to be from her, “Ge” and “Gaia” in accord with individuals’ dialect. She was called “Demeter” like “Ge Meter,” a single name from both; for it was the same (name). There is a statement in his *Hymns* too:

XXII<sup>166</sup>

“Demeter Rhea Ge Meter Hestia Deio.”

For she is also called “Deio” because she was “injured” (*edeiothe*) in sexual union. (Orpheus) will reveal (this) when, according to his verses, she comes to be.<sup>168</sup> (She was called) “Rhea” because many animals (of all sorts) were

correction in the verse where it occurred. Ts.’s θόρ(ν)ηι is equally possible. West implausibly posits an unknown noun θορνη.

166. *Apparatus* to col. XXII: 9 Γῆ ed.: Γῆ<ι> perperam Obbink 13 δ[έ, ὄτ]αν \* 14 ἐπ[η] Ts. γέν[η]τα] \* παν[τοῖα] vel ποικ[ί]λα Ts. u.v. 15 post ἔφω supplevi [βραδύως] ῥέα ut adverbium intellexi: ῥέα ed. 16 “H]ρη Ts. ἐκ[λήθη] Ts. ὅτι \* in fine versus

167. The use of the feminine pronoun in this column may be purely grammatical, and should not be taken to imply that this author believed in a separate feminine deity; I think that, for him, all deities are the same one, i.e., Air/Zeus/Mind/Wisdom/Fate/Aphrodite etc., which has no gender at all.

168. Or “when . . . it (sc. sexual union) takes place.” The reference is either to Zeus’ rape of Rhea, which appears in col. XXVI and leads to the birth of Demeter, or to Demeter’s subsequent union with Zeus (see on col. XX). The author wishes Rhea to be the same as Demeter, citing the *Hymn* in support; but she was different in Orpheus’ poem. The same identification of Demeter with Zeus’ mother shocked the pious author of a commentary on a *Hymn to Demeter* that he ascribed to Orpheus (*OF* 49 = *DK* 1 B 15a = *P Berol.* 13044 lines 15–19 = col. ii 1–5): ὁ Ὀρφεύς ὡς (coniecti) Διὸς ἀδελφὴν παραδέδωκεν, οἱ δὲ μητέρα, ὃν οὐθὲν τῶν εὐ[σ]εβοῦντων εἰς ἐπίμνησιν <πε>ποιήται· ἔ[χ]ει γάρ ἐ[κ] Διὸς καὶ Δήμητρος[ς] θυγατρ[ός] ἀρχὴν Φερσεφόνης[ς] ἢ ἀπ[ο]λεούσης . . . , “Orpheus has handed it down that (Demeter) is Zeus’ sister, others that (she is) his mother, none of which has been composed for mention by those who are pious; for (the poem) begins with Persephone, the daughter of Zeus and Demeter, weaving a chain of violets . . .” Since this author claims in col. i 4–5 that the hymns of Orpheus were written down by Musaeus, this *Hymn to Demeter* may thus be the same as the *Hymn to Demeter for the Lycomidæ* which, according to Pausanias (1.22.7), was the only genuine work of Musaeus.

born (easily)<sup>169</sup> from her; *rhea* (means “easily” among the poets). She was called “Hera” because . . .

\* \* \*

(Next verse:

“He contrived the great strength of wide-flowing Ocean.”)

XXIII<sup>170</sup> This verse has been composed in a misleading way, and is obscure to most people, but to those who comprehend it aright it is obvious that “Ocean” is Air, and that Air is Zeus. Hence one Zeus did not “contrive” another Zeus, but he himself (contrived) “great strength” for himself. But those who do not comprehend it suppose that “Ocean” is (the) river, because (Orpheus) added the epithet “wide-flowing.” But (Orpheus) hints at his own judgment in everyday and colloquial words. For people say that those who have great power among mankind have “wide influence.”<sup>171</sup>

The next verse:

“He put in it the might of silver-swirling Acheloiüs.”

(Orpheus) gives water (generally)<sup>172</sup> the name “Acheloiüs.” The phrase “put in it the might” means<sup>173</sup> that (Zeus’) rule arises in . . . each . . . but wanted<sup>174</sup> . . .

\* \* \*

(the phrase

“equal-limbed Moon”

\* \* \*

. . . For things that are round)

XXIV<sup>175</sup> are equal when measured from the middle, but it is impossible for such (things) as (are) not round to be “equal-limbed.” The following verse reveals it:

“(Moon) who shows for many mortals across the endless Earth.”

One might suppose that this verse was intended differently, because, if (the moon) surpasses (its limits),<sup>176</sup> the things that exist show more clearly than

169. “Easily” (ραδίως, which is *réa* in poetry) puns with “Rhea.”

170. *Apparatus* to col. XXIII: ante 1 τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον \* μήσατο δ' Ὀκκαανοῖτο μέγα σθένος εὐρὺ ρέοντος West 1 πεπόηται ed.: πεποιήται Kapsomenos γινώσκουσι ed.: γινώσκουσιν Kapsomenos 11 ἐγκα[τέλα]σσ' West ἀργυ[ροδίνου] West: -νε[ω ed. 12 διδω]σι Ts. u.v. 13 ἐγκα[τέλα]σσαι \* post West ἐγγε[νέσθ]αι \* 14 τῆν ἀρχὴν \* 15 ἴδ' ἐβουλ[η] vel ἴδε βουλ[η] \*

171. For this sense of *ρύνηναι* cf. Hippoc. *Nat. Hom.* 1.1, ὡς ἂν τύχη μάλιστα ἡ γλῶσσα ἐπιρρυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, with ἐπικρατεῖν used nearby.

172. “In general” is Ts.’s suggestion, but I have not divined the Greek.

173. Literally “is.”

174. Or “plan” (βουλ[η]).

175. *Apparatus* to col. XXIV: ante 1 ὅσα μὲν γὰρ \* κυκλοειδέα Burkert ἐστὶ \* 4 ε(ι)ρησ[θ]αι nescioquis 6 (φήσας) ante φαίνειν per homoearchon omissum supplevi 8 ἅμα Kapsomenos: ἀλλά Merkelbach

176. Cf. Heraclitus on the sun in col. IV above. Laks and Most suggest that the reference is to the full moon.

before it surpasses them. But (Orpheus) does not mean this when he states<sup>177</sup> that it “shows”; for had he meant this, he would not have stated that it “shows for many” but “for all” at once, both<sup>178</sup> for those who farm the land and for sailors, (showing) when one must sail, and the season for the former. For had the moon not come into existence, people would not have found out the number of either the seasons or the winds . . . and all the other (things) . . .

\* \* \*

(The elements of which the sun consists are hot) and very bright, but those of which the moon consists are whitest of all and divided up in accord with the same principle, but are not hot. There are other (elements) too now suspended in the Air far away from each other, but by day they are invisible, as they are dominated by the sun, whereas by night they visibly exist, but are dominated (by the moon) on account of their smallness. Each of them is suspended by Necessity, so that they cannot join up with each other; for were it otherwise, all those (elements) that have the same power as those from which the sun was put together would join up in a lump.<sup>180</sup> Had not God desired the existence of those things that now exist, he would not have created (the) sun; but he created it, and it became of such a kind and dimension as is explained at the start of my treatise.<sup>181</sup>

XXV<sup>179</sup>

The (verses) after these are composed as an obstacle,<sup>182</sup> since (Orpheus) does not want everyone to comprehend them. In the following (passage) he (only) gives hints:

“But when the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus had all (contrived, . . . Zeus wished to unite with his (*[h]eas*) mother in love.”<sup>183</sup>

\* \* \*

(Orpheus says) “mother” because Mind is the “mother” of the other (elements), and *[h]eas* because she is “good.”<sup>185</sup> He reveals that it (*[h]eas*) signifies “good” in the following words too:

XXVI<sup>184</sup>

177. My supplement φήσας, which I believe to have fallen out by a haplography, is essential.

178. I recognize a chiasmus, with τούτοις referring back to the farmers. Laks and Most miss this, translating “when they must sail at the right time.” There is a further chiasmus in the next sentence, since the “seasons” relate to farmers and the “winds” to sailors.

179. *Apparatus* to col. XXV: ante 1 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη Burkert θερμά ἐστι \*: ὑπερβάλωντά ἐστι θερμότητα Burkert 1 λαμπρό[τ]α \*: λαμπρό[τ]ητα ed. 2 (καί) ante κατά supplevi per haplographiam omissum 8 (ἄν) ante ἀλέα suppl. West 13 β]ου[λο]μένο[υ] \*: β]ου[λο]μένο[υ] ed. 14–15 “αὐτ]ῆρ [ἐ]πεὶ [δὴ] πᾶντα Διὸς νόος ἀ[τιγίχ]οιο | [μ]ήσατο” Ts. u.v.: . . . ].[.μει[. ]φστὰδιο [. . . . .]σα[. . .]. West

180. ἀλέα, punning untranslatably on “sun” (ἥλιος).

181. See col. V above.

182. Cf. ἐπιπροσθέω and its derivatives, “to hide, obstruct, obscure.”

183. This refers to Zeus’ rape of his mother, Rhea, to beget Demeter; he will then in turn rape his sister Demeter to beget Persephone. The author refers to both rapes at the end of col. XX, and to the birth of Demeter and Zeus’ rape of her in col. XXII.

184. *Apparatus* to col. XXVI: ante 1 “ἦθελε μητρὸς εἰς μιχθῆμεναι ἐμ φιλότητι” suppl. West ὁ δὲ λέγει \* 2 ἔπεισι \*: ἔπεισιν ed. 11 παρακλιναντι \*: παρακλιναντα imago phototypica

185. The author perversely reads εἰς “his own” as εἰς, supposedly a genitive of εὖς “good.”

“Hermes, Maia’s son, guide and giver of goods” (*eaon*).<sup>186</sup>

It is clear<sup>187</sup> in the following (passage) too:

“For double jars are placed on Zeus’s floor  
of gifts of evil, but the other full of goods” (*eaon*).<sup>188</sup>

Those who do not understand the phrase (*metros [h]eas*) suppose that it means “his own mother.” But had (Orpheus) wanted to present the god as “wanting to unite with his own mother in love,” he could have said “his own (*heoio*) mother,” by changing<sup>189</sup> some letters. For in this way it would become “his own” . . . of her . . . obvious that . . . in the . . . both . . . good (mother)  
. . .

\* \* \*

*a blank sheet of papyrus follows*<sup>190</sup>

*University College London*

186. This verse must be by Orpheus too. It resembles Hom. *Od.* 8.335, which however begins Ἐρμεία Διὸς υἱέ.

187. Or “(Orpheus) reveals it,” if these Homeric verses were reused in an Orphic poem, just as the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* was reused in the Orphic poem in *P Berol.* 13044 (*OF* 49, cited above, n. 168).

188. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 24.527–28 (but Homer has δίδωσι for διδοῦσι and δὲ ἑάων for δέ τ’ ἑάων).

189. My correction παρακλίναντι is essential; παρακλίναντα is an easy error after γράμματα.

190. The book ended here; after the closing *agraphon* there ought to be a *subscriptio* giving the author and title, but perhaps it has yet to be unrolled. West doubted whether either the poem or the commentary could have ended so suddenly (*Orphic Poems* 76, 94–98); was there a further roll? The poem certainly included the birth of Zeus’ daughter-sister Demeter as a result of this rape (cf. the forward reference in col. XXII), and perhaps the rape of Demeter herself, if it is mentioned in col. XXII. Col. XX may also refer to Zeus’ rapes of his mother and sister, and perhaps even to that of his daughter Persephone, unless Aphrodite is meant.