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THE PLOTINIAN LOGOS AND ITS STOIC BASIS.

THE purpose of the present article is to examine the use of Logos as an ontological term in the Plotinian system and to seek to trace its connexion with Stoicism. Although at first the fact that the fundamental meaning metaphysically of Logos for Plotinus is a spiritual activity due, both as created and as creator, to the desire for contemplation may appear to be an obstacle to a close resemblance with the Spermatic Logos of Stoicism, the creative aspect of the elemental Fire, nevertheless abundant and striking similarities in other respects seem to furnish conclusive evidence that the title which I have selected is not mistaken. The full importance of the Plotinian Logos cannot indeed be grasped until the development of the term has been studied not merely in Stoicism but in Philo and early Patristic Literature; for then the common function of Logos in every system, the reconciliation of the transcendent and the immanent views of God, is clearly manifested. But here only a brief indication of the evolution of the Logos doctrine between the diffusion of Stoic thought and the emergence of Neoplatonism is possible. Chief interest will be directed to the use by Plotinus of the spermatic conception, fundamentally Stoic, of a creative Nature which informs and pervades the Cosmos as its immanent Logos.¹

I.

It is well known that in Stoicism Matter, which is defined as the passive and indeterminate substratum of things, is acted upon by the Logos inherent in it, which is God. Logos is the Divine Fire, the seed from which all birth arises and into which disintegration brings all things back. This Logos Stoicism not merely likens to the power contained in seed but identifies with that power, and God, the Logos governing the Cosmos, contains all the individual Spermatic Logoi, whereby everything arises according to Destiny.² Like the Universal Logos, these individual Logoi are immortal and may be said to be derived by Matter from God for the production of the Universe.³ Just as in each particular thing all the parts grow from seed, so the parts of the Universe, including plants and animals, grow up and are then taken back again, cause and all, into the macrocosmic Spermatic Logos.⁴ In the human microcosm Spermatic Logoi are termed one of the parts (viz. the reproductive faculty) of the soul.⁵ Though there is apparently but one passage where the statement is made that the Logos is corporeal,⁶ and though Seneca offers as one of four alternative definitions of Creator *incorporalis ratio*,⁷ it seems clear that the conception of Logos and Logoi as corporeal is implicit in Stoicism, the Logos inhering in and being identical with the seed. So Seneca declares 'Rationem toti inditam et uim omnium seminum singula proprie figurantem'⁸ and 'In semine omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa est.'⁹ Semen is that which is mingled in man with parts of the

¹ The Plotinian Logos has not been granted, when discussed, the importance which it deserves, and scholars have been too ready to find inconsistencies. So Heinze, after saying that on the whole Plotinus follows Stoicism, often through the Alexandrians, professes to find about the metaphysical relation of the Logos 'only unclear and contradictory statements' (*Lehre v. d. Logos*, p. 329). H. F. Mueller, to whom Plotinian scholarship owes much, has well handled the subject (*Lehre v. Log. bei Plotin*)

and, while his treatment is from a rather different angle, I adopt his main position.

² *SVF* II. 1027. Cic. *N.D.* II. 10, 28; 33, 86.

³ *SVF* II. 1074.

⁴ *SVF* I. 497; Marc. Aur. IV. 14, 21; VI. 24; VII. 10.

⁵ *SVF* II. 828.

⁶ *SVF* II. 1051 (so Heinze, *op. cit.*, p. 90, n. 1).

⁷ *ad Helv.* 8, 3.

⁸ Sen. *Ep.* 90, 29.

⁹ Sen. *N.Q.* III. 29.

soul, in the same proportion as that in which they are present in the parent,¹ and, the definition of Chrysippus adds, is in substance identical with the Pneuma. The Logoi are regarded as the Law of Nature: one of the 'goals of Nature' is to move according to them, and in conformity with them both the human Soul and Nature are self-moved.² From the standpoint of theodicy the Logos, to which Matter is obedient and by which it is easily moulded, is incapable of inflicting wrong.³ Even though the Universe experience conflagration, the Logos will survive and, according to a Neoplatonic writer,⁴ the Logoi are the Eternal Causes which take the place in Stoicism of the Platonic Ideas.⁵

The Philonic Logos-doctrine acquires metaphysical importance in so far as it represents a determined effort to embrace the Platonic Ideas.⁶ By means of these the Philonic Logos is the mediator between, but not (as in Stoicism) identical with, God and the Cosmos. Logoi individually are identified with, or may be considered as the creative aspect of, these Ideas, the Ideas operating in the Sensible World.⁷ Philo regards the total Logos as being stretched from the centre of the Universe to its circumference and *vice versa*, and as being caused by God to bind the Universe together.⁸ Like Seneca,⁹ Philo conceives the Logos as the pilot of the Universe and, in full accord with Stoicism, as 'warm and fiery.'¹⁰ Under this aspect, however, it is distinct from the Demiurgic Logos, which embraces the Ideas and which, as we learn in *De Opificio Mundi*, constitutes the incorporeal and Intelligible World, the Idea of Ideas. This Intelligible World, consisting of the Ideas contained in God,¹¹ is the Divine Logos in process of cosmic creation. 'Just as a city that has already been moulded in the architect did not have place outside, but had been stamped on the soul of the craftsman,¹² in the same way the World composed of Ideas could have no other place than the Divine Logos which has set in order this world.'¹³ In fact, the Logos from this viewpoint is the sum of the Ideas,¹⁴ and, identifying the Spermatic Logoi of the Stoa with the Platonic Ideas,¹⁵ Philo makes those Logoi transcendent, though he claims that they remain at the same time immanent in the Sensible World. From this point of view Philo (to a much greater degree than Plutarch and the Hellenizing philosophers of Judaism¹⁶) anticipates Plotinus, for Logos and Logoi are duplicated. And yet, even if M. Bréhier's judgment—too strong I believe in its present form—could be accepted, that in Plotinus is found 'in almost every detail the Logos-theory in the shape which it assumes in Philo,'¹⁷ the lack of philosophical coherence in the Philonic theory ought to warn us against attaching too great importance to it. Moreover, the Plotinian Logos, unlike the Philonic or the Stoic, is never designated in material terms. The Higher Logos both embraces and constitutes the Philonic World of Ideas, whereas the Plotinian Nous, the term for the World of Ideas, rather than being equated with Logos is its producer, and, as

¹ SVF II. 741.

² SVF II. 780. 1132.

³ Marc. Aur. VI. 1; IX. 1.

⁴ Proclus, SVF II. 717.

⁵ In Aristotle (*De An.* I. i. 403a 25) we meet λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ, which are 'forms possessing their essence in matter and being inseparable' (Philoponus, *ad loc.*). Cf. Enn. I. 8, 8; VI. 1, 29.

⁶ Cf. *Op. Mun.* 20. etc.

⁷ 'Goettliche Ideen, die in der Form von gestalteten Kraeften zu Naturprinzipien werden' (Meyer, *Gesch. v. d. Keimkraft*, 46).

⁸ *De Plant.* 8. Cf. SVF II. 719.

⁹ *De Cher.* 30; *De Sacr.* 87. Although the Philonic Logos rarely receives material attributes (*vide* Leisegang, *Heil. Geist*, pp. 66, 67), it

clearly fails by this fact to be a spiritual concept like that of Plotinus.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Vide C.Q.* XXIV., p. 198, n. 7.

¹² Cf. for this notion that artefacta are not (as Plato had said) in imitation of sense-objects, Cic. *De Or.* 9, Sen. *Contr.* V. 36, *Ep.* 58, 21, Dio. Pr. 12, 36, Plot. *Enn.* V. 8, 1, [Clem.] *Recog.* 8, 54. It is perhaps Posidonian.

¹³ *Op. Mund.* 24.

¹⁴ *Migr. Abr.* 103. Cf. Clem. Strom. V. 3, 16.

¹⁵ Cf. *C.Q.*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁶ *Vide Plut.*, *Is. et Os.* 59; *Qu. Conv.* VIII. 2, 3, 719; Aristeas, *Ep. ad Philocr.* 279.

¹⁷ *Texte et Trad.* III., p. 19.

Whittaker remarks,¹ Logos is never used as a technical term for the Second Hypostasis in Plotinus.

Plotinus is preceded by several thinkers who were led to adopt the Spermatic Logos; but although the Stoic conception had apparently already been dematerialized in Neopythagoreanism,² which held that Number is the extension and energy of the Spermatic Logoi in the Monad,³ it is in the Plotinian system that the dematerialized reproduction of the Stoic concept first appears as an organic and indispensable element. For, as a principle at once rational and creative, the Logos is a mainspring operating Plotinus' cosmogony; by using the Logos he successfully accomplishes the arduous descent from Reality, the realm of Nous, to Process, the realm of Becoming. Either to refuse to see in Plotinus the spermatic conception at all,⁴ or to deny the Logos a place in the hierarchy of hypostases,⁵ appears to me to fail to appreciate the consistency in his doctrine which the following examination seeks to reveal.

II.

Plotinus occasionally adopts the well-known distinction, developed by Stoicism⁶ and found in Philo,⁷ between the *λόγος προφορικός* and the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*. The contrast is not for Plotinus, as for Philo and the Stoics, of fundamental importance, but is introduced merely as a useful illustration: 'As the spoken Logos is an image of that in Soul, so that psychic Logos which is the interpreter⁸ of the Logos in the Higher Hypostasis is broken when compared with that which ranks before it.'⁹ And from other passages¹⁰ it becomes clear that Universal Soul is the Logos, the Interpreter, of Nous in the Sensible World. Further examination reveals the fact that Logos under its purely noetic aspect is the All-Soul, which, by the well-known Plotinian theory that the lower principle is not cut off from its producer,¹¹ inheres in Nous, but in so far as the appropriate act of Soul *qua* Soul is discursive reasoning¹² is logically distinguishable. This All-Soul, Soul *qua* Third Hypostasis, Soul Absolute, may be regarded as the Life (*ζωή*) in Nous which exists logically, not temporally, prior to the World-Soul, above which no less than above all individual souls it stands.¹³ Now, as distinct from this higher phase, appears the World-Soul, Soul conceived as pervading and animating the corporeal order which Nous has called into existence, the Creative Logos which engenders the things subsequent to Soul,¹⁴ and to which Plotinus applies the term *φύσις*. Plotinus expresses his meaning figuratively when, in the Fifth Treatise of the Third Ennead, he adopts the Platonic allegories of Poros and Penia, and Eros Zeus and Aphrodite, and (with a warning to the reader not to take his words too literally) shows that Poros (the Noetic Logos) in conjunction with Penia (personifying Matter) begets in Soul (represented by Aphrodite the daughter of Zeus, the type of Nous) the Logos Eros as his offspring, Poros himself inhering in Zeus. Under both aspects Logos is synonymous with Soul. But, like Philo, Plotinus introduces a further development, combining his Logos doctrine with the Ideal Theory by the use of Logoi in the plural. From Nous and the Noetic Logos and Logoi is produced the Universe which is extended in

¹ *Neoplatonists*, 37.

² *Vide e.g.* Meyer, *op. cit.* 48. The Stoic term is of course used by Justin Martyr of Jesus (*Ap. II.* 8. 13).

³ Syr. in Arist. *Met.* xiii. 6.

⁴ Cf. Heinemann, *Plotin*, 67.

⁵ Cf. Bréhier, *Texte et Trad.* Notice to *Enn.* III. 2, 3.

⁶ The idea is even earlier: Arist. *Anal. Post.* I. 10, 76b, 24; Plat. *Soph.* 263b.

⁷ Vit. Mos. II. 127. *Vide* also Albinus, *Prol.* c. II. *ad init.* and Apoll. Tyan. *ap. Eus. Prep. Ev.*

150c (cf. *Enn.* V. 1, 6).

⁸ Philonic (*Leg. All.* III. 207).

⁹ *Enn.* I. 2, 3.

¹⁰ V. 1, 3; II. 9, 1; IV. 3, 11.

¹¹ The favourite expression is *οὐκ ἀποτέμνηται* or, positively, *ἐξήρηται*. *Vide* Theiler, *Problem.* 101.

¹² *λόγος* in a psychological sense. The context generally decides which of its many meanings in Plotinus the term is to receive, but occasionally e.g. in VI. 7, the choice of a single meaning is difficult. Cf. Theiler, *op. cit.* 66, 67.

¹³ V. 1, 10; II. 9, 8.

¹⁴ Cf. V. 1, 7.

space;¹ Nous as the Demiurge of the Universe bestows Logoi on Soul, which uses them to fashion *sensa*.² This is explained by the fact that creation is the result of contemplation: Soul, by beholding the eternal Ideas, conceives immaterial Logoi, which are then reflected on the lower phase of Soul as Logoi operative in matter. Individual souls are Logoi of the Ideas more unfolded than the latter,³ and Soul *qua* Third Hypostasis is the sum of all the Logoi,⁴ which occupy the same place in Soul as the Ideas in Nous. The One, which transcends Nous, will obviously be in relation to Logoi only *qua* the ground of Nous; Logos in Plotinus, unlike its forerunner in Stoicism,⁵ is far from constituting an ultimate principle.⁶

Confining our attention mainly to the spermatic aspect of the Plotinian Logoi, we see that they are neither corporeal nor quantitative.⁷ From other passages it becomes clear that the Logos derives its importance not from identity, but from connexion with Sperma.⁸ From the Fourth Essay of the Second Ennead we learn that bodies require to be produced from the moulding of matter, the incorporeal substrate, by the Noetic Ideas, in which production the Spermatic Logoi are the immediate agents. Logos produces variety in animate bodies, but as the principle of order and determination is opposed by indeterminate matter, which is identical only with that part of Otherness opposed to the Logoi.⁹ Elsewhere it is said that the forms indwelling in matter are not the same as they would have been in themselves, but are infected by it: for example, the Logos may not be able to hide the ugliness of matter, and the result will be an ugly face.¹⁰ The Logoi as principles ruling over matter have a greater degree of reality, but matter itself is devoid of Logos, a shadowy declension from it.¹¹

The Plotinian objection to the Stoic conception of creative Logos is simply that this is derived from matter, and, because it is not pure form, does not possess priority: it does not create a composite *by having come into matter*.¹² As Bréhier well remarks: 'Le Logos est bien un mouvement, comme l'ont vu les Stoïciens, mais ce n'est pas le mouvement du feu; c'est dire qu'il accepte tout du stoïcisme, moins le matérialisme.'¹³ This position is made abundantly clear. Not matter but Soul constitutes Logos, and Soul cannot be imagined, though entering matter, to set it aflame.¹⁴ Matter can indeed become fire, but only on the arrival, not of fire, but of the appropriate Logos.¹⁵ Logos is exterior to matter, not in the sense that they 'are at the two opposite poles,' but in the sense that their natures are different. Only the Soul, not matter, contains Logoi as indwelling powers.¹⁶ 'If matter,' asks Plotinus,¹⁷ 'on (Stoic) premises *qua* body is the same everywhere, surely the very fact that it makes distinct bodies owing to the qualities which it has received shows that these acquired qualities are really immaterial Logoi?'¹⁸ In another place apparently both Stoics and Epicureans are criticized: 'If fire also is a Logos which works in matter, and each of the other elements is as well, fire cannot arise automatically. For whence could it come? From an attrition, one might suppose.'¹⁹

¹ III. 2, 2. The Noetic Logos, which calls the Sensible World into being (*τιθεὶς κόσμον* in IV. 4, 39), is likened to the Ithyphallic Hermes in III. 6, 19 (cf. Cornut. *Theol. Comp.* 16; Porphy. *ap. Eus. Prep. Ev.* III. 114; Macr. *Sat.* I. 19, 14; Just. *Ap.* I. 22; and Hippolyt. *Ref. Haer.* IV. 48).

² V. 9, 3. ³ IV. 3, 5. ⁴ VI. 2, 5.

⁵ Cf. also Celsus (*Or. Cont. Cels.* 5, 24: *ὁ τῶν πάντων λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ὁ θεός*.)

⁶ *θεῖος λόγος*, according to H. F. Mueller, occurs twice in Plotinus: in VI. 1, 26 it is obviously not Plotinus whose view is given, and in I. 6, 2 the term (common in Philo) should not mislead any one to identify *λόγος* with *τὸ ἐν*. In III. 2, 18

ἀρχὴ λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος is self-explanatory, since the *ἀρχή* meant is, not *τὸ ἐν*, but *τὰ πάντα* in Nous.

⁷ IV. 7, 2, 5, 9.

⁸ V. 9, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10.

⁹ II. 4, 16.

¹⁰ I. 8, 9, 11.

¹¹ VI. 3, 7.

¹² VI. 1, 29.

¹³ *Op. cit.* III. p. 19.

¹⁴ III. 6, 12.

¹⁵ III. 8, 2.

¹⁶ III. 6, 15.

¹⁷ IV. 7, 9. For the theory criticized at the end of the chapter cf. Manil. IV. 891; Diog. Bab. fr. 30 *SVF*; Marc. Aur. V. 33.

¹⁸ So also are quantities (II. 4, 8E).

¹⁹ Cf. Lucret. V. 1095 sqq. 1242. Manilius (perhaps Posidonian) I. 856.

But this is impossible, because fire exists in the Universe before friction between bodies arises; the bodies themselves already possess fire when friction takes place. The potentiality of matter is not such that it can of itself produce fire. If, then, the principle which produces fire must be a Logos, since it bestows form, what principle is it? It is Soul, which is able to produce fire, i.e. it is Logos and life which together constitute one and the same principle.¹ In one passage the Spermatic Logoi are introduced under the name of Forms: 'They must not be placed on one side apart, with matter on the other side right away from them, so that the irradiation received by it reaches it from somewhere on high. . . . Speaking more precisely, we must not assume that Form is locally separated from matter, and then matter possesses the Form as a reflection in water, but rather that it encompasses the Form on all sides, as it were embracing and yet not embracing it.² By this approach matter derives in its entirety what it can from Form; for there is nothing intermediate, and the Form does not permeate the whole of matter nor glide over it, but remains in itself.'³

The Demiurgic Soul is said to create the Sensible World in imitation of the Intelligible, 'just as the Spermatic Logos, which from the immobile seed develops itself by gradual evolution, it seems, into plurality, shows manifestly by partition its multiplicity. Instead of keeping its internal unity it expends that outside itself. Its advance is a gain in size but a loss in strength.'⁴ As being the total Logos, the All-Soul will be able to sketch out beforehand the powers of individual souls ere they proceed from it. This sketch will resemble preliminary irradiations upon matter, which will be followed by the individual soul.⁵ The Logos of each thing, whether of plant or of animal, must *qua* Logos exhibit unity in multiplicity;⁶ the unity of soul is not to be understood in the sense that it is one Logos, but in the sense that its substrate is one, and soul may constitute any number of Logoi as great as its original number.⁷ We may wonder how a human soul—i.e. a human Logos—can participate in the body of a brute. But soul is potentially all things, only functioning at different times according to a different Logos.⁸ Every Spermatic Logos contains within itself the Logos for the matter of every animal. The matter will be worked upon by it, either being found to be consonant with the Logos or receiving from the latter an appropriate quality. For the Logos of an ox can inhere only in the matter of an ox. Thus (and here Plotinus countenances metempsychosis) the Logos-soul will be transformed from what it was originally to become the Logos of an ox.⁹ The Logos, of which the arrival in matter produces body, must contain within itself all the qualities. It is pure immaterial form which, though in contrast with the Noetic Logos it is inseparably connected with matter, is notwithstanding separable from it in thought.¹⁰ Nature, which is identical with the total Spermatic Logos, produces the Logoi in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and these Logoi themselves abiding bestow something on the material substrate.¹¹ 'The Logos in the seed, producing form and colour, is not identical with the seed. For these Logoi are themselves invisible. . . . The Spermatic Logos is identical with the soul which contains the Logoi, yet that soul, not having itself begotten the Logoi, does not behold what it possesses:¹² soul in this phase is an image, even as are these Logoi.'¹³ 'Even in seed, that which has

¹ VI. 7, 11.

² Hence arises an inconsistency, purely verbal, between matter which is constantly termed *ἀπαθές* and the *παμπαθές* of I. 8, 3.

³ VI. 5, 8.

⁴ III. 7, 11.

⁵ VI. 7, 7.

⁶ VI. 7, 14.

⁷ VI. 2, 6. From V. 7, 3 it is clear that soul contains an infinite number of Spermatic Logoi, which (unlike Noetic Logoi) are not all simul-

taneously effective.

⁸ VI. 7, 6; cf. Porph. Sent. 17.

⁹ III. 3, 4.

¹⁰ II. 7, 3.

¹¹ III. 8, 2.

¹² 'The Logos in matter is neither an act of Nous nor contemplation, but a faculty of modifying matter, acting unwittingly (*οὐκ εἰδύια ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον*, II. 3, 17).

¹³ V. 3, 8.

chief rank, is not the moist matter, but that which is unseen, i.e. a principle of number, a Logos.¹

Nature may be said to contain a Logos of beauty which is the pattern of the Logos in bodies; but an even more beautiful pattern than the Logos in Nature is its source, the Logos in Soul.² The shadow cast by Soul goes as far as the Logos which proceeds from Soul, and this Logos is of such a character that it may generate a bulk as great as the Idea wished it to generate.³ The total Logos is conceived as a systematic multiplicity of Logoi, a psychic creature (ζῶον ψυχικόν) possessing varied forms.⁴ The entire Logos-Soul has potentially in itself the faculty of bringing order in the Sensible World: 'in the same way also Seed-Logoi mould and fashion animate things as it were into little worlds.'⁵ 'In that which is posterior to Soul, things often hinder one another, and are deprived of attaining their natural form which the individual Logos desires.'⁶ Soul bestows on bodies the shapes of which it has the Logoi—the celestial deities in the Sensible World and all.⁷ Owing to the wondrous art displayed by Nature every thing is begotten as a Logos, dwelling in matter, but modelled after a Logos which is prematerial.⁸ Biological reproduction is due to the impulse of the indwelling Logos.⁹ 'In every living thing, a unity, there is produced by Nature a multiplicity of events, not, however, all simultaneously; there are the periods of life, and at fixed times sprout out—e.g. horns, beard. The breasts develop, the bloom of life is reached, and procreation of others in the same species becomes possible. New Logoi are added without the destruction of these originally present, as is clear from the fact that in the offspring the same total Logos is again manifested.'¹⁰ If all goes well, the birth of children takes place in accordance with the Spermatic Logos. Plotinus, however, allows that sometimes obstacles prevail, present either in the mother or in her environment.¹¹ With his usual skill of observation, he points out that when in an animal a gash or wound occurs, the parts are spontaneously drawn and joined together so that the wound is healed: this, he maintains, is due to the governing Logos.¹² Perhaps the fact that Logoi are intermediaries, and must always first yield to the affections of matter,¹³ accounts for a gradual deterioration which is observable in men of to-day as compared with men of yore.¹⁴ The Soul does not need to shake up the Logoi, since matter, once it has obtained Logoi, does its share by creating an upheaval for those Logoi which come later.¹⁵ Matter, in fact, not the Spermatic Logos, is responsible for evils: so also the Logoi in the arts are not responsible for the flaws and all which conflicts with those arts.¹⁶ Nevertheless matter is dominated in the direction of greater good. And so from all things unity is produced, even though *sensa* are in a different state, as the products of matter and Logoi, from that which they occupied in the Logoi.¹⁷ The Logos, then, which inheres in matter is the generative Soul, which is in its turn modified by the

¹ Philo (*Op. mund.* 43) mentions 'the spermatic principles in which the Logoi are unseen and hidden' but are 'made manifest in due season.' Clement knows a Logoi 'secret and invisible' which is a binding power (*Strom.* V. 12). If *SVF* II. 744 is wholly Stoic (Heinze sees the influence of Platonizing Pythagoreans) the Stoic Logoi were conceived as Numbers. For the Pythagorean view cf. *Simpl. Arist. Cat. Schol.* in *Ar.* 67a, 38 sqq.

² V. 8, 3. Cf. what Philo says in *Leg. All.* III. 150: ὁ σπερματικός καὶ γεννητικός τῶν καλῶν λόγος ὁρθός.

³ IV. 3, 9.

⁴ IV. 3, 8.

⁵ IV. 3, 10.

⁶ IV. 3, 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ IV. 3, 11.

⁹ III. 8, 7.

¹⁰ IV. 4, 11. Cf. *Enn.* IV. 3, 13; *Sen. N.Q.* III, 29 (quoted *supra*), *SVF* II. 749; I. 98.

¹¹ II. 3, 14E.

¹² III. 3, 5.

¹³ Perhaps this may be a hint from Posidonius: cf. Philo, *Op. mund.* 140, 150; *Sen. ep.* 90, 6.

¹⁴ II. 3, 16. The next sentence is aptly compared by Bouillet with *Sen. De Prov.* 5: (Ipse omnium conditor) semper paret, *semel* iussit.

¹⁵ II. 3, 16 *ad fin.* σεισμός deserves comparison with Orig. in *Ioh.* XXVI. 5, 35-8; Clem. Alex. *Paed.* II. x, 94, 4; Albin. *Didasc.* 13 (p. 169, 1, 7 Herm).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ II. 3, 16.

'ruling part' of the Soul, shining down and forming imprints of the Noetic Logoi on that creative phase.¹ 'As long as Nous and Soul exist, the Logoi will flow down² into this lower phase of Soul, just as, while there be a Sun, all lights will flow down from him.'³

III.

The Stoic conception of Logos as the productive power in the Sensible World does not mean the adoption by Plotinus of Stoic Determinism.⁴ The Spermatic Logos is indeed adopted as a determinant principle in every case save that of rational human beings.⁵ For these the causal principle required is not that psychic power which as Nature is contained in animal and vegetative seed and even inorganic things,⁶ but rather the pure unmixed Soul, which, as we have seen, is the Noetic, not the Spermatic, Logos. Professor Heinemann rightly says that 'Plotin protestiert gegen die Gleichsetzung dieses Logos mit der Naturnotwendigkeit.'⁷ Only the Higher Logoi and Logos can exercise control over the Universe. Thus Plotinus escapes Stoic Fatalism by regarding the Sensible World as in itself the best of all possible Worlds, but, in relation to the Ideal World, as imperfect. In full agreement with Stoicism he sees Providence in control of this World, but argues that in the last resort this is only a 'second-best,' a position which pantheistic Stoicism could not adopt. The Logos-Soul in its higher Noetic phase attains freedom and exercises as All-Soul Providence. The Logos-Soul in its lower Spermatic phase is under the dominion of Destiny and Necessity. Like Stoicism, Plotinus combines Freewill and Determinism, Providence and Fate; but his is a much easier combination, just because the Soul participates in two Worlds, and the Logos is not merely Spermatic.

As an entirety Soul possesses potentially the faculty of bringing order to the Sensible Universe. The limits of the duration of the Cosmos being fixed by immutable Logoi, things in this World are brought to pass under a single Logos.⁸ The Cosmic Law is woven from the Laws Yonder and those here, which are the Logoi or creative movements in the Soul,⁹ and evils happen according to the Higher Logos, not according to Logoi of Nature, but only concomitantly.¹⁰ The events in the World take place according to those Logoi, which comprehend likewise the events prior to dependence on Spermatic Logoi. For the Spermatic Logoi do not possess that which can arise contrary to themselves: they contain none of those things which arise from matter to contribute to the Universe, none of those deeds mutually performed by engendered things.¹¹ The Noetic Logoi, whereby the things in this World arise according to the same immutable pattern, are said to reside in those principles which are Creators (viz. the Ideas in Nous, as being beyond the

¹ II. 3, 17.

² Cf. Clement's *δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς ἀπόρροια τοῦ λόγου* (Staehlin, iii, 202) (*ἀπορρέον* in *Enn.* III. 2, 2) and contrast the cruder Philonic notion of a 'shower of Logoi' (*Leg. All.* III. 162).

³ II. 3, 18. I have discussed (*C. Q.* XXIV. 205-6) the figure of the Sun as source of undiminished giving. Professor Forsey has called my attention to *Lucr.* V. 281-305, 590-613, and it seems probable that here again we have to reckon with Posidonian influence.

⁴ *Vide* Heinze *op. cit.* 320. ⁵ III. 1, 8.

⁶ VI. 7, 11; IV. 4, 27. Cf. *SVF* III., p. 90, 1, 16. *Sen. N.Q.* II. 1.; VI. 16. Posidonius seems to have developed the notion (Reinhardt, *Kosmos u. Symph.*, p. 108.) Cf. Theiler, *op. cit.* 61 sqq.

⁷ I am unable to believe that Plotinus opposes

'eine Herabziehung des Logos in die Sphaere der Naturzeugung.'

⁸ IV. 3, 12. The Periodic Doctrine here and in IV. 4, 9, V. 7, 1, being combined with the Logos-doctrine, seems indubitably Stoic in basis. Professor Heinemann holds that the Stoic doctrine is inconsistent with the Plotinian view that World-Creation is timeless (*Plotin*, 72). But the fact that the Plotinian Cosmos is an 'ewige Konstruktion' which no Stoic *Ekpurosis* can destroy, allows the adoption of Logoi and Periods. To the objection that every Period needs its appropriate Nous, one Nous only is needed; for the Periods are identical. Cf. with IV. 3, 12 *Plut. Def. Orac.* 426A; *Marc. Aur.* VI. 1.

⁹ IV. 3, 15.

¹⁰ IV. 3, 16.

¹¹ IV. 4, 39.

reach of Providence and Freewill), and, residing in that 'better-ordered realm,' they are embraced by a Logos which is not single and immanent in them all merely *per accidens*. The Sensible World is the realm of Chance from which Nous is far removed.¹ 'Just as in the Spermatic Logos all the parts of the organism are together in the same place without any conflict . . . and afterwards, when the animate organism is born and assumes bulk, each part is at a different point, and one becomes to another an impediment, so also from Nous a Unity and from the Noetic Logos arose this World.'² The Noetic Logos makes things on different grades because it contains variety due to Nous. The Cosmic Creative Logos, proceeding from complete unities, viz. Nous and Soul-Life, is neither a single Soul-Life nor a single Nous, nor complete in every respect.³ Of necessity divided, though its simplicity is not thereby destroyed, it must be composed of parts that are unequal⁴ and indeed contrary.⁵ The Noetic Logos embraces both good and evil, not indeed creating them but coexisting with them. The Spermatic Logoi and Nature are the activity of Absolute-Soul, which is unity containing difference. Hence the Spermatic Logoi as parts will exhibit a proportionately greater difference. Their acts in which the creative process terminates exhibit an even wider contrast.⁶ The two phases of Logos, the one the engendering, the other linking the Higher Order to the World of Process, constitute together the Universal Province.⁷ The Sensible World is governed by Soul in accordance with Logos, just as in each living thing the indwelling principle fashions the parts that proceed from it and coordinates them with the whole, which contains all the parts, whereas they contain each only as much as it is. Logos implies that each thing acts and is acted upon not haphazard nor according to the chance occurrence of events, but by a law of Necessity. The real agent is not the Spermatic Logos but the Higher Soul which contains the Spermatic Logoi and knows the consequences of every deed which it performs.⁸

Viewed in either its Noetic, i.e. Providential aspect, or its Spermatic phase, i.e. as a principle in the necessary sequence of events in the Sensible World, the Plotinian Logos fulfils in Theodicy a rôle which manifests profound Stoic influence. The right act on the Plotinian view is performed not by the Providential Logos and yet conformably with it; the evil act is likewise not performed by it but is ruled by Fate, and is part of the causal nexus of events in the Lower Order. We do evil when, without any compulsion of the Providential Logos, we add our acts of ourselves to those of Providence and of its subordinate Logos and Logoi, and are then unable to bring the result into connexion with the Providential Will.⁹ Right will, which rises above the affections of the body, seeks that Good which the World-Soul, Nature, seeks or more truly beholds, and aims at the same goal as the Universal Will. Slaves perform many actions on the orders of their master, but the will of the good man is directed to the end proposed by his Master also.¹⁰ And so the Plotinian Theodicy embraces a Determinism which is not far removed from that of Stoicism.¹¹

In view of the abundance of material, the present investigation can hardly claim to be exhaustive. Perhaps there are certain apparent contradictions in the Plotinian doctrine which, in the short space at my disposal, I have failed to discuss. The influence of earlier systems on the philosophy of Plotinus is difficult to assess exactly

¹ VI. 8, 17.

² III. 2, 2.

³ III. 2, 16.

⁴ III. 2, 17.

⁵ III. 2, 16. Cf. *Enn.* I. 8, 15; *SVF* II. 1169; *Sen. N.Q.* 7, 23; *Ep.* 107, 8; *Philo, Qu. Rer.* 311; *Plut. Is. et Os.* 55, 373d.

⁶ III. 3, 1. Cf. Gollwitzer, *Lehre v. d. Willensfreiheit* (1901-2) on this passage: 'The Logos of Providence and its parts are not to be considered

as seed-powers, i.e. as producing all from themselves, but as powers which embrace and unite.'

⁷ III. 3, 4.

⁸ II. 3, 16.

⁹ III. 3, 5.

¹⁰ IV. 3, 35.

¹¹ *Vide SVF* II. 1002. Cf. *Enn.* IV. 4, 45; *SVF* I. 527; *Sen. Ep.* 54, 7; *Marc. Aur.* III. 4; *Plato, Rep.* 379c; *Laws*, 904.

and, though I have no doubt that here in his Logos-doctrine (as indeed elsewhere in his teaching¹) he is building upon a Stoic basis, yet due allowance must be made for the dematerialization and other changes which in the manner of Alexandrian speculation he introduces. But in two respects I believe that the Stoic and the Plotinian theories are similar. In both systems Logos is an ontological conception of fundamental importance. In both systems Logos is developed with the desire, which a monistic attitude towards the Universe promotes, for a rigidly consistent doctrine of creative activity.

R. E. WITT.

READING.

¹ A detailed study of the subject, the results of which I hope to produce later, convinces me that in general Stoicism greatly influences Plotinus.