SKEPTICISM, TRUTH, AND THE GOOD LIFE: A COMPARISON OF ZHUANGZI AND Sextus Empiricus

Prologue:

Nine days I drifted on the teeming sea before dangerous high winds. Upon the tenth we came to the coastline of the Lotos Eaters, who live upon that flower. We landed there to take on water. All ships' companies mustered alongside for the mid-day meal. Then I sent out two picked men and a runner to learn what race of men that land sustained. They fell in, soon enough, with Lotos Eaters, who showed no will to do us harm, only offering the sweet Lotos to our friends—but those who ate this honeyed plant, the Lotos, never cared to report, nor to return: they longed to stay forever, browsing on that native bloom, forgetful of their homeland. I drove them, all three wailing, to the ships, tied them down under their rowing benches, and called the rest: 'All hands aboard; come, clear the beach and no one taste the Lotos, or you lose your hope of home.' Filing in to their places by the rowlocks my oarsmen dipped their long oars in the surf, and we moved out again on our sea faring.


Every tradition has its skeptics. But people are skeptical for different reasons. Even when the arguments in favor of doubt are quite similar they can be doing surprisingly different work depending on the surrounding structure of beliefs and values. What are, in effect, the same skeptical arguments can mean very different things in different contexts and consequently be subject to different criticisms. Thus it is not enough to look at the arguments themselves in isolation: one must also look at the role they are supposed to play in the good life.

Zhuangzi in ancient China and Sextus Empiricus in Hellenistic Greece both doubted our ability to know the truth. In particular, they doubted our ability to know for certain what is best for us, so that in the discussion that follows the words “true” and “good” are more or less interchangeable. In both cases, it was the diversity of opinion over these issues that made them question how we could ever be sure of being right. Rather than bemoan the inaccessibility of truth, however, they both also agreed...
in encouraging people to accept their ignorance and embrace skepticism as a way of life. But they did this for quite different reasons, as can be seen in their various responses to the standard objection against skepticism that it claims to know something in its very avowal that it knows nothing. The project of unearthing these differences raises some interesting questions about our own ideas of the nature of truth and the role that it plays in the good life. In particular, it forces us to ask ourselves what it is that we are looking for in philosophy, whether we want truth for its own sake or only for relief from our uncertainties; that is, whether we really need to find Ithaka after all or if we would not be just as happy settling down in Lotus land.

Skeptical Arguments

Although there were skeptical tendencies in the classical period, the most famous being Socrates’ claim to know only that he did not know, the tradition that became known as “skepticism” really began with Pyrrho of Elis, who lived between 360 and 275 B.C. and traveled to India with Alexander, where he encountered the gymnosophs, or “naked philosophers.” After his return, Pyrrho is said to have exhibited a state of remarkable peace of mind through his refusal to pronounce anything good or bad. Since he left no writings, it was largely on the strength of his personal example that he inspired the branch of Greek skepticism that is alternately known as “pyrrhonism” in his name. Pyrrho’s student Timon moved from Elis to Athens, where various forms of skepticism thrived and competed with one another over the next century and a half. Finally Aenesidemus carried skepticism to Alexandria in Egypt, where it was adopted by the school of medical empiricism and received its paradigmatic expression in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 160–210).

Sextus, who was himself a trained physician, compiled the works of his predecessors and marshaled skepticism’s attack against opposing schools. In his principle work, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, he describes skepticism as

the power to oppose appearances and ideas to one another in any way whatever, by means of which, on account of the counterbalancing of examples and arguments, we arrive first at the suspension of judgment (epoche) and after this at peace of mind (ataraxia).

The originating cause of skepticism is, we say, the hope of attaining peace. Talented people who were disturbed by the inconsistencies in things and at a loss as to which of them they should accept embarked on the search for what is true in things and what is false, in order that by deciding this they might attain peace of mind.

... (but) having begun to philosophize in order to decide about appearances and to judge which of them are true and which false so as to attain peace, they fell into equally balanced contradictions, and being unable to decide...
they suspended judgment; and for those who had suspended their judgment, there followed, as it happened, at the same time, peace with respect to the way things seem.  

The goal of philosophy for Sextus is ataraxia, “peace” or “peace of mind,” which is attained through epoche, or the “suspension” of dogmatic judgments. Dogmatic judgments are judgments that go beyond the way things seem to make claims about the way they really are.  

The pyrrhonian skeptic starts out assuming that things really are the way they appear, that round-looking towers are round and that good-seeming actions are good. But his confidence is shaken by inconsistencies, the fact that the same tower looks square up close and the same action seems reprehensible to someone else or considered in a different light. The budding skeptic is torn between these conflicting ways of looking at things, not knowing which of them he should trust. So he turns to philosophy, hoping that the discovery of truth will resolve his doubt and ease his mind.  

The more he considers these problems, however, the more it seems to him that they cannot be resolved. All he has access to are the ways things seem to him, and he is not able to get outside of appearances to find anything to check them against. Even if things actually were the way they seem, he would have no way of knowing this. In the end the pyrrhonist gives up on truth and reconciles himself to the notion that all he knows about things are the ways in which they appear.  

Once he accepts this idea, however, he is no longer victim of the painful discrepancy between what he claims to know and what he can be certain of. His discomfort vanishes immediately. As soon as he stops demanding truth, his inability to get beyond appearances no longer poses a problem for him and he suddenly finds himself in possession of the very peace of mind he was looking for all along:  

The same thing is said to have happened to the painter Appelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse’s foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints of his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of the horse’s foam. So too the skeptics were in hope of gaining peace by means of a decision regarding the disparity of objects of sense and thought, and being unable to do this they suspended judgment; and they found that peace, as if by chance, followed upon their suspension, even as a shadow follows on its substance.  

The pyrrhonist was hoping truth would ease his mind, but his inability to find it only made his anxiety worse. Once he accepts his ignorance, however, he finds to his surprise not only that peace is possible without discovering truth but that it is gained precisely by abandoning the search.

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The practical differences in the life of the skeptic before and after his apostasy are subtle but significant. On the surface, the only change may be that he now prefaces everything he says with the phrase “it seems to me that…” But this small alteration signals some very important changes in attitude. On the one hand, although he is still bothered by the presence of things that seem bad to him and the absence of things that seem good, this troubles him less than it did before:

[For] though, as a human being, he suffers emotions through the senses, yet because he does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the added opinion that something is of such a kind is worse than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion that it is a horrible experience.10

The pyrrhonist suffers like anyone else from cold and hunger and presumably even things like shame and disappointment. But the fact that he does not see these things as anything more than unpleasant sensations releases him from unnecessary anxiety and allows him to move through life with a modicum of turmoil: “the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly, and is thereby at peace.”11

More importantly, having acclimated himself to life in a world of appearances, the skeptic is no longer troubled by his inability to know the truth about things. People are happy in the possession of what seems good to them, according to Sextus, and miserable in the presence of what seems bad, as the example of the bystanders at the surgical procedure makes clear. The fact of conflicting impressions makes doubt inevitable and irresolvable; so as long as it seems to people that they can only be happy in certain knowledge of the truth, then they will always be troubled by their inability to attain it. “For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is forever being disquieted,”12 Sextus says; “therefore it is not possible to live happily if one posits anything good or evil by nature.”13 The peace the skeptic seeks is primarily freedom from this one particular disturbance, which vanishes once he no longer demands the truth but contents himself with the way things seem.14

Peace, or ataraxia, is reached through epoche, the suspension of dogmatic judgment. And the method Sextus uses to bring about epoche is to dwell on precisely those inconsistencies in our experience that caused us to doubt in the first place. He systematizes this process by isolating various sets of tropoi or “tropes,” literally “turnings,” which generate conflicting arguments and counterexamples designed to bring home the idea that what we know about things are their appearances, not the way they really are.
Sextus offers ten tropes to confute sense impressions by comparing the way things appear to people with the way they appear to animals, to other people, to our ears as opposed to our eyes, and so forth. The point of these examples, Sextus emphasizes, is not to reject sense impressions but rather to dispel the illusion that they provide us with anything more than evidence of the way things seem:

When we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance—and it is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not a matter of appearance but a judgment regarding appearance. And even if we do actually argue against appearances, we do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the dogmatist; for if reason is such a trickster as to all but snatch away the appearance from under our very eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the case of things non-evident...

By "things non-evident," Sextus means any supposed "way things really are" in contrast to the way they seem. If we demand of the senses that they give us insight into the way things are in themselves, then we will always find their evidence unsatisfactory. Once we accept them instead as witnesses to how things appear, however, we will find their testimony incontrovertible.

In addition to the ten tropes challenging the senses, Sextus also presents tropes designed to discredit the ability of reason to reveal any more than what seems to be the case. Reason judges things true or false according to some criterion, such as logical consistency, empirical evidence, the testimony of an impartial observer, and so forth. But how do we know that we have the right criterion, especially when people disagree about which one to use?

In order to decide the dispute that has arisen over the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute: and in order to possess a criterion, the dispute must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning, the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we shall force them into an infinite regress.

Every argument, according to Sextus, ultimately reduces to either circular reasoning, truth by assumption, or an infinite regress. Even if we proceed from axioms that seem indubitable, this still only tells us what seems to us to be necessarily the case but provides no guarantee that these things are so in fact. Again, Sextus does not reject the use of reason any
more than he rejects the use of the senses; both provide perfectly adequate information about the way things appear. What he objects to is the unsubstantiated claim that either reason or the senses give us any direct access into the way things really are.

Neither reason nor the senses tell us what is true but only what seems. If we demand truth, then, we can never be sure of having found it, or even that it exists, and our whole lives will be plagued by doubt and fear. We can be quite confident, by contrast, of the way things seem. So if we simply content ourselves with pursuing the things that seem good and avoiding those that seem bad, although we will still be bothered by heat and cold, we will not be haunted by the absence of an unknown and unknowable truth and so can live as comfortably as people may.

Compare this to a passage from Zhuangzi, a Chinese daoist from the late fourth century B.C.:

Nie Que asked Wang Ni, “Do you know what all things would agree upon as right?”

Wang Ni said, “How would I know that?”

“Do you know that you don’t know it?”

“How would I know that?”

“In this case, then, do things know nothing?”

“How would I know that? But even so, suppose I tried saying something. How could I know that when I say I know something I don’t actually not know it? How could I know that when I say I don’t know something I don’t actually know it? But let me try asking you something—if people sleep in the damp, then their waists hurt and they wake half paralyzed; but is this true of an eel? If they live in trees they shudder with fear; but is this true of a monkey? Of these three then, which knows the right place to live? People eat the flesh of grass-fed and grain-fed beasts. Deer eat fodder. Maggots like snakes. And hawks enjoy mice. Of these four, which has the right tastes? Monkeys take baboons as partners. Deer can relate to elk. Eels hang around with fish. People regard Maoqiang and Lady Li as very beautiful. But if fish saw them they would dive deep. If birds saw them they would fly high. If deer saw them they would cut and run. Of these four, which knows beauty aright? From where I see it, the principles of benevolence and righteousness and the pathways of right and wrong are all snarled and jumbled—how would I know the difference between them?”

Despite differences in style, Zhuangzi and Sextus employ similar arguments toward the similar goal of inducing the reader to suspend judgment over things she cannot be sure of.

Both doubt reason as well as the senses. And both take their starting point from conflicting impressions and the diversity of opinion between individuals. Once two people disagree on a fundamental level, Zhuangzi argues, there is no way of saying which one is right:
“Once you and I have started arguing ... whom shall we get to set us right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to set us right? But if he already agrees with you how can he set us right? Shall we get someone who agrees with me to set us right? But if he already agrees with me how can he set us right? Shall we get someone who disagrees with both of us to set us right? But if he already disagrees with both of us how can he set us right...? This being the case, you and I and others are all unable to understand one another. Shall we wait for someone else?”

The argument can only be settled by reference to some judge or criterion. But the choice of a judge or criterion depends in turn on one’s initial standpoint, which is precisely the issue waiting to be resolved.

If we assume that there is a fact of the matter, then some of the contradictory opinions must be wrong. But once we admit that opinions can be wrong, we no longer have any means of knowing which ones are right, since all we have to base our judgments on are opinions of our own. The difficulty only becomes more intractable when we consider the fact that we so often change our own minds and disagree with ourselves:

Confucius has been going along for sixty years and has changed his mind sixty times. What at the beginning he used to call right he has ended up calling wrong. So now there’s no telling whether what he calls right at the moment is not what he called wrong fifty-nine times in the past.

Some people’s opinions may in fact be right, but there is no way for anyone, either themselves or others, to know that this is the case. We think we know the way things really are and that those who disagree with us are wrong, but, as Sextus argues, “if (things) really possessed the nature they are said to possess, there would have been no controversy about them.” Or, as Zhuangzi puts it, in a strikingly similar turn of phrase, “if right were really right, it would differ so clearly from not right that there would be no room for argument.” Diversity of opinion does not prove that there is no truth but does draw into question our ability to know what it is or even that it exists. Thus for both philosophers it is this diversity, both between people and within the individual, that forms the foundation for their skepticisms.

Obviously neither philosopher can claim to have proven that the truth is unknowable. The suspension of judgment that each of them tries to bring about in his reader is not a claim to knowledge so much as an admission of ignorance. Zhuangzi wants us to abandon our preconceptions about what is good and bad and to treat everything as the same. But, as the late Angus Graham was fond of pointing out, Zhuangzi never argues that they really are the same (which was the position of his antagonist, the sophist Hui Shi), but only that the sage treats them as though they were. As for Sextus, generations of commentators have... Paul Kjellberg
complained of the illogic of his tropes, failing to recognize that their function is not to prove that his view is correct (which would, of course, be self-contradictory) but rather to persuade us to see things the same way. Sextus himself does not claim to be proving anything, but merely describing] the tropes by which suspension of judgment is brought about, but without making any positive assertion regarding either their number or validity, for it is possible that they may be unsound or that there may be more of them than I shall enumerate.27

The tropes make no positive claim about truth, not even that it is unknowable. Their function is not to instill belief but rather to effect a change in attitude and behavior such that one no longer speculates about the way things are in themselves, not even to say that they are unknowable, but contents oneself instead with knowledge of how they appear.

It seems to Sextus as though we cannot be sure of the truth, and he wants it to seem this way to us as well. In his chapter “Why the Skeptic Sometimes Purposely Propounds Arguments which are Lacking in the Power of Persuasion,” Sextus describes the skeptical project not as theoretical but as therapeutic:

The skeptic, on account of being a lover of his fellow human beings (philanthropos) desires to cure by speech, as best he can, the rashness of the dogmatists. So, just as the physicians who cure bodily ailments have remedies that differ in strength, and apply the severe ones to those whose ailments are severe and the mild ones to those who are mildly affected, so too the skeptic propounds arguments which differ in strength. . . . Hence the adherent of skeptic principles does not scruple to propound at one time arguments that are weighty in their persuasiveness, and at other times such as appear less impressive—and he does so on purpose, as the latter are frequently sufficient to enable him to effect his object.28

The point of skepticism is not to change our beliefs about the way things are but rather to break us of such beliefs altogether. Even when Sextus does employ what look like proofs, he does so only provisionally, “such that they are able to cross themselves out on their own,” like a cathartic drug that purges itself along with the disease.29 Neither Sextus’ nor Zhuangzi’s skepticisms are meant to prove that anything is true but rather to foster an attitude of doubt.

One final and often ignored similarity between Sextus and Zhuangzi that should be noted before moving on is the central role played by moral doubt in both their skeptical projects. Although some of the most widely quoted passages from Zhuangzi involve dream skepticism, there is little evidence in the text to suggest that he entertained any serious doubts about the existence of the external world. The majority of his writings deal
almost exclusively with ethical and evaluative questions of good and bad, right and wrong, and noble and base. His use of dream imagery is frequently linked directly to these issues:

Those who dream of drinking wine may weep when morning comes. Those who dream of weeping may in the morning go off to hunt. While dreaming they do not even know it is a dream.... Fools, they think they are awake—so officiously they claim to know it, calling this one a lord and that one a herdsman. Incorrigible!30

Our inability to know that we are not dreaming is paralleled here by our inability to know that we will not later reverse our judgments about the relative worth of human beings. Clearly the metaphor is invoked to make a point about moral epistemology rather than metaphysics.

Sextus, by contrast, extends his skepticism beyond ethics to include logic, physics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, music, and even grammar. Since his reintroduction to Europe early in the fifteenth century he has been associated largely with doubts about our knowledge of the external world. But the ethical dimension of these issues is clearly central to his thought as well. All by itself, the fact that under certain conditions a square tower looks round hardly causes a normal person much anxiety, far less leads her to doubt whether or not the tower has any actual shape. But the brief and sudden disillusionment in a long-cherished value can indeed and often does cause one to doubt ones previous judgments altogether. And, doubtless, it is this sort of worry that the skeptic is trying to escape in his ideal of ataraxia. Certainly our moral judgments are part and parcel of our understanding of and relation to the world around us, such that it would not be possible to disentangle them. Nonetheless, modern philosophers from Descartes to Moore, all of whom owe a debt to Sextus,31 tend to focus exclusively on doubts concerning objects in the external world, forgetting the central importance of the moral dimension in the development of skepticism historically.

The Roles of Truth and Doubt in the Good Life

The fact of diversity of opinion, particularly on questions of value, leads both Sextus and Zhuangzi to doubt our ability to know what is best for us. But both of them see the recognition of this ignorance not as an impediment to the good life but rather as a means toward it. Underneath these similarities, however, they have very different notions of the nature of the truth which they doubt. Consequently the mechanism by which skepticism leads to the good life is quite different for the two of them.

Sextus distinguishes the appearances of things (phainomena) and the impressions they make on us (phantasia) from the truth about them (alethia) or the way they are by nature (phusei).32 (The word “nature” will also be used in a different sense in connection with Zhuangzi, but I trust
that context will be sufficient to keep the two uses of the English word distinct. Thus the truth about a thing, the way it is in itself or “by nature,” is something different from the way it appears. It is not out of the question to suppose that a thing may actually be as it appears; the skeptic’s point is that we can never be sure.

The argument that we cannot know the truth does not imply that there is no truth, although Sextus does frequently suggest such a conclusion:

If, then, there exists anything good by nature or anything evil by nature, this thing ought to be common for all men and good or evil for all. For just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not warm some but chill others … so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others…. But there is nothing good or evil common to all … therefore there does not exist anything good or evil by nature.33

In effect, Sextus uses an epistemological skepticism, which doubts our ability to know whether what seems good to us is really good, to suggest an ontological one, which doubts whether goodness even exists except as a mode of seeming.34

The tropes do not prove that there is no truth about these things, though they certainly leave that possibility open. Since all we have access to are appearances, to posit the existence of a truth beyond anything we could ever know or experience seems speculative at best, or, as Sextus repeatedly describes it, “rash” (propetes).35 With regard to values in particular, our joys and sorrows are due to things that seem good or bad to us, as illustrated by the example of the bystanders at the surgical procedure; it is not clear what role, if any, the truth plays in all this. Thus the pyrrhonist not only does not know what or whether the truth is; more importantly, he is no longer even sure that he cares.

This shift from epistemological to ontological skepticism, from doubting our ability to know the truth to doubting its existence, is no mere slip but is crucial to Sextus’ project. The goal of pyrrhonism is ataraxia, peace of mind.36 The skeptic took up the pursuit of truth in the hopes that it would lead to this, though his inability to find the truth only leaves him more anxiety-ridden than ever. As long as he still cares about the truth, the bare possibility of its existence will leave him uneasy. It is only after he reconciles himself completely to life among the appearances that he is no longer troubled by his inability to know whether truth exists or not and so is finally able to rest at ease.

There is no word in Zhuangzi’s Chinese corresponding to our “truth” or Sextus’ “alethia.” Nonetheless, he does think that there is a fact of the matter about what way of behaving is best. There are, however, a few important differences between the way he thinks about this fact and the
way Sextus does. Sextus conceives of rightness and wrongness as an objective property of things or actions independent of observers, like the roundness or squareness of a tower. On Zhuangzi's vision, by contrast, the rightness of a course of action depends to a large degree on the context and the individuals involved:

If the water is not piled up deeply, it won't have the strength to bear up a big boat. Spill a cup of water into a hollow in the floor and mustard seeds will make boats for it. But set the cup there and it will stick fast, for the water is too shallow and the boat too big.... Someone heading off into the green meadows can bring three meals and return with his stomach still full. Someone traveling a hundred li needs to grind grain for an overnight. Someone traveling a thousand li needs to collect grain to last three months.37

The rightness of the depth is not an intrinsic property of the water but depends on the size of the boat, just as the right amount of food depends on the length of the journey. Similarly with people, the right way to live is a function of what might be called their individual "natures," that is, their particular needs, abilities, and capacities, as well as the situations they find themselves in. Thus although Zhuangzi does not speak in terms of "truth," he clearly thinks that there are facts about how best to live in the world, facts which, admittedly, vary markedly depending on the circumstances.

But although the truth about how to live is indexed to the individual for Zhuangzi, it is not for that reason any easier to know. It is certainly not the case that what is right for people is whatever seems right to them. He tells a story about a boy from Shouling who travels to Handan to learn the Handan Walk. Before he manages to learn it, however, he suddenly finds that he has forgotten the Shouling Strut, and so is forced to crawl home.38 The right way to live has to do with facts about one's nature, one's intrinsic needs and capacities, as well as about the surrounding world, facts about which it is all too easy to be mistaken.

Once again, it is the fact of conflicting impressions, even within a single individual, that makes the problem of uncertainty apparent:

Lady Li was the daughter of the border guard of Ai. When the king of Jin first got hold of her, her falling tears drenched the collar of her robe. But once she'd arrived at the king's palace, slept with him on his couch and eaten the meats of grass-fed and grain-fed beasts, afterwards she regretted her tears. How do I know that the dead don't regret their earlier longing for life?39

The fact that we could always reject our present judgments, at least in principle, indicates to Zhuangzi that we can never be sure of our knowledge even of what is right and wrong for ourselves.

These different understandings of truth lead Zhuangzi and Sextus in very different directions. For Sextus, thinking of the good as a quality of Paul Kjellberg
things distinct from their appearances, the fact that no one thing appears
good to everyone strongly suggests that there is no truth about the
matter at all. For Zhuangzi, on the other hand, who thinks of the truth as
the optimal course of action for a particular individual in a particular
situation, the fact that there is no one way of acting that works best for
everyone all the time hardly implies that some ways of acting are not
better for some people some of the time. For Sextus, people live well
when they are not disquieted by the presence of things that seem bad to
them or the absence of things that seem good. If it seems to people that
their happiness depends on the validity of dogmatic claims, then they will
be forever disquieted since they can never be sure these things are true.
If it seems to them that they can be happy without such knowledge, then
they can rest at ease in the world of appearances not worrying about the
accessibility or inaccessibility of truth. For Zhuangzi, by contrast, for a
particular person in a given situation, there is a right course of action that
is independent of how things might seem to her. Thus truth is relevant to
the good life for Zhuangzi in a way that it is not for Sextus.

Despite these differences, both see skepticism as instrumental in the
project of living well. Sextus’ skepticism persuades the reader that she
can be perfectly happy without knowledge of the nature of things and so
leaves her in a state of ataraxia, or “peace of mind,” which is for him the
final goal of philosophy. The way in which skepticism leads to the good
life for Zhuangzi is a little more complicated. His skepticism issues in a
state similar to Sextus’ ataraxia, which I will call “equanimity,” but which
performs a very different function.

Throughout the text, Zhuangzi invokes the image of the “Perfect” or
“True Man” who refuses to hold any opinions about what is good and
bad:

The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, knew nothing of
hating death. He emerged without delight and went back without a fuss. He
received something and took pleasure in it; he forgot about it and handed it
back.40

The Perfect Man is daemonic. Though the lowlands burn it cannot sear him.
Though the Yellow River and the Han freeze it cannot chill him. When the
furious lightning splits mountains and winds thrash the seas it cannot startle
him…. Death and life make no difference to him, how much less the princi-
pies of benefit and harm.41

The True Man is not immune to death and suffering, although Zhuangzi
likes these magical descriptions. Rather he simply refuses to acknowledge
these things as evils, since he does not know for certain that they are
really bad. Elsewhere Zhuangzi tells admiring stories of people struck with
horribly disfiguring diseases who await their further suffering and death
with perfect calm, unwilling to judge whether they might not be better
off after their transformation. Thus, just as ataraxia is reached through epoche, equanimity arises from the suspension of judgment, or, to use Zhuangzi’s terminology, the “forgetting” (wang) of one’s previously held beliefs and values.

But although Zhuangzi’s equanimity is similar to Sextus’ ataraxia, the role it plays in his philosophy is altogether different. Rather than being an end in itself, the purpose of equanimity is that it leads to the life that best fulfills one’s nature. On one level, its function is purely precautionary. Different things are good for different people, and what saves one person might easily kill another. Whereas Sextus is worried about the psychological problem of avoiding worry, Zhuangzi is worried about the practical problem of avoiding making mistakes like the boy from Shouling who went to learn the Handan walk. He tells another story about a beautiful bird that landed in the capitol city of Lu. The ruler of Lu was so pleased with it that he gave it a room in the palace, entertained it with the royal orchestra and feasted it with the finest delicacies; “but the bird only looked dazed and forlorn, refusing to eat a slice of meat or drink a cup of wine, and in three days it was dead.” Because we cannot be certain about what is best either for ourselves or others, or in this case birds, and because our mistaken guesses threaten to do us considerably more harm than good, Zhuangzi recommends that we suspend our judgment on these matters and not guess randomly at things we do not know.

But the value of equanimity does not consist simply in avoiding harm. It has positive benefits, as well, in directing individuals along the best path. The reason for this is that instead of being some elusive quality of things in themselves lurking behind their appearances, as it is for Sextus, the good for Zhuangzi is rooted in the nature of the individual and his or her concrete situation in the world. Zhuangzi’s implicit reasoning is quite plausible, that ultimately, on some fundamental level, we are drawn to the things that are good for us. If we simply consider our situation objectively and open-mindedly, transcending our momentary prejudices and fixations, we will find ourselves spontaneously moved in the direction of what is best for us. Zhuangzi’s skepticism is heuristic; by questioning our beliefs we discover what is true, not in the sense of discovering propositions which we cannot doubt, like Descartes, but in the sense of discovering values about which we cannot be mistaken.

Thus Zhuangzi is skeptical only with respect to the intellect; he doubts our ability to figure out what is best or to “know” the truth in this sense. He has complete faith, however, in the ability of our instinctive and spontaneous responses to lead us in the right direction. It is only on the basis of this faith that he can afford to be skeptical. He does not, however, trust in just any spontaneous responses: he trusts spontaneous responses upon open-minded consideration of all the possibilities, that is, from the standpoint of equanimity. The role of skepticism for Zhuangzi, then, is to

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put the individual in a position where she can trust her intuitions to lead her in the right direction. Equanimity does not issue in propositional knowledge, which Zhuangzi distrusts as misleadingly oversimplistic, but rather in spontaneous inclinations in the best direction.

Equanimity opens the eyes of the True Man, so to speak, allowing him to respond to things as they actually are rather than as he is predisposed to think of them as being. Zhuangzi tells a series of stories about skilled individuals who, by virtue of having surrendered their preconceptions, are uniquely able to adapt and respond to novel situations as they present themselves. In one story, a swimmer dives into the turbulent waters beneath a high waterfall, and then emerges unhurt a hundred yards downstream. When asked how he did this, the swimmer replies:

I have no way.... I go under with the swirls and come out with the eddies, following along the way the water flows and never thinking of myself. That’s how I stay afloat.46

It is precisely because he has no preset plan or strategy that the swimmer is able to respond to the changing situations in which he finds himself. And it is by virtue of having no preconceptions about himself that he is better able to respond to his own changing and idiosyncratic needs. Our preconceptions about ourselves as certain types of people with certain types of needs are perhaps a greater threat to our well-being than our preconceptions about the world around us, according to Zhuangzi. As the surrendering of these preconceptions, equanimity enables people to respond more effectively both to the world and to themselves.

This dual aspect of the responsiveness that comes with the admission of ignorance, responsiveness both outward toward the world and inward toward ourselves, is well illustrated in another story about a man named Woodcarver Qing, who is particularly famous for his bell stands. When asked how he does it, he says:

I am only a craftsman—how could I have any method? There is one thing, however. When I am going to make a bell stand ... I always fast in order to still my mind. When I have fasted for three days, I no longer have any thoughts of congratulations or reward, of titles or stipends. When I have fasted for five days I no longer have any thoughts of praise or blame, of skill or clumsiness. And when I have fasted for seven days, I am so still that I forget I have four limbs and a body. By that time, the ruler and the court no longer exist for me. My skill is concentrated and all outside distractions fade away. After that I go into the mountain forest and examine the heavenly nature of the trees. If I find one of superlative form, and I can see a bell stand there, I put my hand to the job of carving; if not I let it go. This way I am simply matching up Heaven with Heaven.47

“Heaven” (tian) here is used in the sense of “nature”. By forgetting all his conventional notions of how a bell stand is supposed to look, the wood-
carver is able to match up his own natural needs and interests, including his unpredictable aesthetic responses, with the natural contours and capacities of the wood he is working with, and so is able to create bell stands of surpassing beauty. Equanimity makes room for this kind of skillful responsiveness, enabling people to integrate themselves with the world and to fulfill their needs within their particular surroundings in the best way possible.

For practical purposes, Zhuangzi and Sextus end up recommending very similar life-styles. Sextus describes the life of pyrrhonian skeptics under four headings:

Adhering to appearances we live undogmatically according to the rule of life since we cannot remain completely inactive. This rule of life seems to be fourfold: part lies in the guidance of nature, part in the needs of the passions, part in the tradition of laws and customs, and part in the teaching of the arts... But we say all these things undogmatically...48

Although Zhuangzi does not formulate any similar prescription, his stories also emphasize attention to one's natural needs, a healthy respect for the laws of the land, and the cultivation of skills and arts. The only point on which they disagree is the role of the passions. Sextus seems to accept them as harmless and inevitable needs. Zhuangzi is in general hostile to the passions for their distorting influence on perception and their interference with open-minded responsiveness.

Both philosophers think that this life-style leads to the good life or “happiness.” But given their different understandings of truth they have different notions of the role skepticism plays in living well. Since Plato,49 the Greeks had assumed that happiness (eudaimonia), consisted in possession of the good.50 But such an ideal only makes us miserable, Sextus argues, because we can never be confident even of knowing what the good is, much less of having it. So he redefines happiness instead as ataraxia: “all unhappiness arises because of some disturbance (taraxia).”51 Happiness, then, is found in ataraxia, which means literally “the absence of disturbances.” People are disturbed by the absence of things that seem good to them and the presence of things that seem bad. Certain things, like hunger and cold, seem bad inevitably, and even the skeptic cannot avoid them altogether. To anyone operating under the traditional notion of happiness, however, the inaccessibility of the truth will provide an additional, and to Sextus’ mind unnecessary, source of anxiety. By reconciling people to their ignorance so that the inaccessibility of the truth no longer seems so bad to them, skepticism frees people from this one particular disturbance. Though they may still suffer such unavoidable discomforts as heat and cold, their doubt makes it possible for them to live as happily as people may.

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For Zhuangzi, there is a best way for each person to live, depending on his or her particular situation. While he doubts our ability to “figure out” this way, he is confident that we will gravitate toward it spontaneously so long as we simply attend to the whole situation with an open mind. Thus skepticism performs for him not just the psychological function of releasing us from worry but also the pragmatic one of guiding us along the right path.52

Objections

Both Zhuangzi and Sextus are persuaded by the diversity of opinion that we cannot be sure about what is best. And both urge us to acknowledge and embrace this ignorance in order to live as well as possible in spite of it. For Sextus, the admission of ignorance is desirable for the psychological reason that it releases us from the anxiety of having committed ourselves to claims we cannot be sure of. For Zhuangzi, it is desirable on the practical grounds that it puts us in the best position possible to live the lives that are really best for us. In spite of these differences, however, both philosophers are subject to a similar objection, which is that their protestations of ignorance contain implicit claims to knowledge about the way things really are.

The charge that by denying that truth can be known the skeptic has already made a claim about it was a familiar one in Sextus’ time and had already been addressed by other philosophers before him. He responds by distinguishing pyrrhonian skepticism both from dogmatism, on the one hand, and from the Academic skepticism of people like Arcesilaus and Carneades, on the other:

[W]ith regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, some claim to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring.53

Were he to argue, as the Academic skeptics had in the past, that the truth really is unknowable, then he would be guilty of having made a claim about it beyond anything that could be derived from appearances alone. In point of fact, however, all he is doing is admitting his ignorance and explaining why it is that the truth seems to him unattainable. “Our task at present,” Sextus says in the beginning of the Outlines and repeats at regular intervals throughout the work,

is to describe in outline the skeptic doctrine, first premising that with none of our future statements do we positively assert that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment.54

Sextus is only describing the way things seem. The point of his argument is not to prove that things really are this way but rather to make them seem this way to us as well.

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To refute the objection that even the skeptic dogmatizes, Sextus does not have to prove that what he says is correct, but merely to demonstrate that it is possible to adopt a skeptical position without making any unverifiable claims about the truth. And this he can do quite easily simply by limiting his description to the way things seem. In saying that the truth seems unknowable to him, the skeptic is not making any claim about the way the truth is, but merely expressing his own uncertainty about it. The truth may in fact be unknowable, in which case he is right. Or it may be knowable, in which case he is wrong. In either case, he is secure in his claim that it seems unknowable to him. Whether he is right or wrong does not matter, since security and peace of mind are more important to him than truth.

Here again, Sextus seems to be dogmatizing with his assumption that ataraxia is really worthwhile and is a more valuable goal than truth, an inconsistency which is, on occasion, glaringly obvious:

[Since] the persuasion that some things are good by nature and others bad produces disturbance, then the assumption and persuasion that anything is, in its real nature, either good or bad is evil and to be shunned.55

But again, Sextus does not claim that ataraxia is good in truth, only that it seems preferable to the skeptic over the anxiety of guessing at things he could not possibly be sure of. Nor is ataraxia a value we come to appreciate only at the end of our journey. Sextus argues that the desire for peace of mind was the “originating cause” of our taking up philosophy in the first place and has remained our goal all along.56 And examples like the bystanders at the surgical operation support this, suggesting that what troubles people is not the way things really are but rather the way they seem. Thus pyrrhonian skepticism is not about truth. It makes no claim one way or another about the way things really are but deals entirely with appearances. By changing the way things seem, by making it seem to people as though they can and have lived happily without certain knowledge of the true nature of things, skepticism frees them from anxiety and makes it possible for them to live as well as people may.

A parallel objection is raised against Zhuangzi by the Confucian Xunzi, who lived about a generation later. The objection against Sextus is that he makes a dogmatic claim about the true nature of things in denying that it can be known. The objection against Zhuangzi is that he makes a similarly unwarranted assumption about human nature in his jump from his own ignorance about what is best to the conclusion that such knowledge is impossible in principle. Although this assumption does not itself play a role in any of Zhuangzi’s arguments directly, it forms part of the background within which his skepticism is meant to operate.

Xunzi criticized Zhuangzi, saying, “Zhuangzi was obsessed by thoughts of Heaven and did not understand the importance of Human-
ity.” Xunzi uses the word “Heaven” here in the same sense that Zhuangzi used it in the story of Woodcarver Qing, that is, as the natural state of things, and in particular the natural state of ourselves, with our intrinsic needs, capabilities, and limitations. By “Humanity” (ren) Xunzi means things that are human-made and added to nature as the product of conscious thought, that is, culture. Without going into an in-depth study of Xunzi’s thought, which is complicated enough in its own right, we can elaborate his objection on two levels. On one level, he challenges Zhuangzi’s skeptical equanimity as a means for discovering our natural needs. Zhuangzi assumes that if we simply respond open-mindedly we will be drawn in the direction of what is best for us. But there might well be things that fulfill very real needs which we are not, however, in a position to appreciate ahead of time: we would not ask a child, for instance, whether she felt naturally inclined to attend school, nor would we send a sick person into a drugstore to take whatever drugs appealed to him most after open-minded consideration. We may well have real needs, rooted in our nature, that Zhuangzi’s equanimity will not reveal.

On a more subtle level, rather than simply questioning equanimity’s efficiency in fulfilling people’s nature, Xunzi challenges Zhuangzi’s underlying assumption that the fulfillment of nature is all that there is to a good life. Zhuangzi draws an implicit distinction between the things we really need and the things we only think we want, and, contrary to Sextus, says that the good life depends on the satisfaction of the former, not the latter. The things we think we want only matter to Zhuangzi insofar as they effect our acquisition of the things we really need. But Xunzi objects that the good life may depend on the satisfaction of certain cultivated desires, things which, to begin with at least, we only think we want without having any natural need for, and which hence are the products of “Humanity” as opposed to “Heaven.” Such carefully cultivated desires, among which Xunzi includes the social and moral desires, may be very deep-seated and sincere, but they will never be “natural” in Zhuangzi’s sense since they are not in us by nature. Consequently, their value cannot be discovered on any amount of open-minded reflection. Xunzi compares the effort of the untrained person to appreciate the most important things in life to that of “a blind man trying to distinguish colors or a deaf man tones.” Thus the practice of Zhuangzi’s skepticism might arbitrarily preclude us from things that constitute a very important part of a human life.

Xunzi lived about a generation after Zhuangzi, so Zhuangzi never had a chance to respond to his criticisms. Nonetheless, at several points in the text Zhuangzi seems to recognize this difficulty and responds, as does Sextus, by adopting a skeptical attitude toward his own skepticism. The surprising sympathy he displays toward Confucius, the champion of precisely the received wisdom about how people ought to live that Zhuangzi attacks, may reflect his recognition that he himself also relies
on methodological assumptions about which he cannot be certain. At
another place, after bewailing the futility of people’s lives spent in the
frantic pursuit of arbitrary ideals, he steps back and asks, “Are other
people’s lives really this confused? Or am I the one that is confused and
other people not confused?” In other places, as well, Zhuangzi seems to
acknowledge uncertainty as to whether his own skeptical project is the
right way to proceed.

The question still remains, however, of the significance of this self-
doubt in the context of Zhuangzi’s overall project. It will not do the work
for him that it does for Sextus. Sextus only wants to avoid the anxiety of
worrying that he might have made a wrong claim, which he can avoid
easily by not making any claim at all. Zhuangzi does not simply want to
avoid worrying, though: he wants to find the right answer. While protests-
tations of ignorance might relieve him from uncomfortable feelings of
responsibility, they do not by themselves bring him any closer to his goal.
In fact, if Xunzi is right, they may even distance him further from it.

A second possibility is that Zhuangzi might be recommending this
self-doubt methodologically. That is, he may be suspending his judgment
between his own skeptical program and Xunzi’s more traditional one to
see which way his nature spontaneously moves him. And yet, the adop-
tion of this methodology assumes that one’s spontaneous responses are
a reliable guide and hence only succeeds in begging the question.

The third possibility, of course, is that Zhuangzi’s self-doubt might be
an honest acknowledgment of the limitations of his own approach.
Zhuangzi’s inability to answer Xunzi’s objection does not prove Zhuangzi
wrong or Xunzi right. There are countless Xunzis, all insisting that we have
to look at things their way in order to see why their way is right. What
Zhuangzi’s inability to answer Xunzi does suggest is that, whether or not
we claim to know what it is, as long as we believe that there is some fact
of the matter about what is best, that is, as long as we think that living
well is not simply a function of getting what we want but rather of
wanting the right things, then we cannot avoid guessing and can never
be certain that we are not mistaken. Even the refusal to guess relies on
guesses of its own. Thus a certain lingering doubt seems inevitable, on
Zhuangzi’s model, even for the skeptic, which is exactly the reason Sextus
rejects that model.

Conclusion

So where does that leave us as skeptics? We find ourselves back
where we started, with Odysseus in the Land of the Lotus Eaters. Con-
flicting impressions make it impossible for us to be sure what the truth is
or even that it exists. Sextus suggests we just forget the whole problem.
We never wanted truth anyway, he tells us, just peace, which we can
easily get by forgetting about truth altogether. Zhuangzi seems commit-
ted to the idea that there is a truth. He recommends doubt as the way to find it but acknowledges the possibility that doubt itself might already be a step in the wrong direction. If we believe that there is some Ithaka out there, then we are forced to admit that we do not know where it is or even how we will recognize it when we find it. And, of course, the possibility remains, too, that there is no truth beyond appearances, that things really are as they seem to Sextus, and that we have been in Ithaka all along.

NOTES

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1 – See, for instance, Plato’s Apology 21d.

2 – Diogenes Laertius, Life of Pyrrho, sec. 2.


4 – This translation is R. G. Bury’s, with a few emendations of my own. References to Sextus will be either O.P. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) or A.E. (Against the Ethicists), followed by the book and section number. This passage, for instance, is O.P. I, 8, that is Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book one, section eight.

5 – O.P. I,12.

6 – Ibid., I,26.

7 – Ibid., I,13.

8 – Ibid., I,28–29.

9 – Ibid., I,15.
I generally follow Watson’s translation in *The Complete Writings of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), with some substantial emendations of my own. I also use the pinyin system of rendering Chinese words into English. References to Chinese texts are to the Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index series by page, chapter, and line. This passage is Zhuangzi 6/2/64–70, that is, page 6, chapter 2, lines 64 to 70.


22 – Ibid., 75/27/10–11. The *Zhuangzi* is almost certainly the product of multiple authors. In this study, I focus primarily on the seven Inner Chapters, the oldest stratum of the text, which is generally recognized as being the work of one man, occasionally drawing from passages which Graham has identified as being either by Zhuangzi himself or by some of his more sympathetically minded followers. See Angus Graham’s article “How Much of Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?” in *Studies in Classical Chinese Thought*, thematic issue of *Journal of the American Academy of Religions* 47, no. 3 (September 1979): 459–502, and also his book *Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).

23 – O.P. 1.177.


25 – Ibid., 95/33/74.

26 – Graham, *Inner Chapters*, p. 20 and note on p. 35.

27 – O.P. 1.35.

28 – Ibid., 111.280–281.

29 – Ibid., 1.15.

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31 – For discussions of Sextus’ textual history as well as his influence on the development of modern European Philosophy, see the essays by C. B. Schmidt, Martha Brandt Bolton, and Richard Popkin, among others, in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

32 – For the equation of phantasia and phainomena, see O.P. I.19, and for contrast of alethia and phusei with phantasia, see O.P. I.25–30.

33 – A.E. 69, 71.

34 – Gisela Striker explores these two sides of Sextus’ arguments, which she refers to as the “undecidability thesis” and the “relativity thesis,” in her essay “The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus,” in The Skeptical Tradition.

35 – O.P. I.20, 177, 205; III.280, etc.

36 – Ibid., I.12.

37 – Zhuangzi 1/1/5–6, 9–10. A li is a linear measure of approximately a third of a mile.


40 – Ibid., 15/6/7–9.

41 – Ibid., 6/2/71–73.

42 – Ibid., 17/6/45–60.

43 – Ibid., 19/6/89–93.

44 – Ibid., 47/18/33–35.

45 – Compare the beginning of Descartes second meditation: “I will nevertheless make an effort and try anew the same path on which I entered yesterday, that is, proceed by casting aside all that admits of the slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false; and I will continue always in this track until I find something that is certain” (Descartes, Meditations, trans. Veitch [La Salle: Open Court, 1962] p. 29).

46 – Zhuangzi 50/19/49–54.

47 – Ibid., 50/19/55–59.


49 – For instance Symposium 204e.

Philosophy East & West 50 – A.E. 110.
51 – Ibid., 112.

52 – In this sense, Zhuangzi’s skepticism is similar to the fideism of Pascal and especially the later Montaigne. Although both were familiar with and to some degree inspired by Sextus (see Terence Penelhum’s article “Skepticism and Fideism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, pp. 287–318), they saw the function of skepticism as clearing away dogmatic delusions, not to purge us of the notion of truth, but rather to make room for its revelation, either in the form of undeniable facts such as the simultaneous wretchedness and divinity of human existence, for Pascal, or for the inspiration of God through nature, for Montaigne.

53 – O.P. 1.2.

54 – Ibid., 1.4, and passim, e.g., 1.197.

55 – Ibid., III.238.

56 – Ibid., 1.12.

57 – Xunzi 79/21/22.

58 – Ibid., 5/2/39–40.